On June 22, 1941 the Dictator of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler turned the attention of his nation’s war efforts to the east; towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That day 3,300,000 German soldiers embarked upon one of history’s most ambitious military campaigns by invading the Soviet Union and creating the infamous “Eastern Front”. As mentioned in many of Adolf Hitler’s speeches, the Soviet Union contained more living space for the German people. More important to the German war machine and Hitler however, was the fact that the Soviet Union contained a seemingly endless supply of grain and oil. If these resources were ever at Hitler’s disposal, he would have the ability to wage war indefinitely. This was something both the Soviet Union and Great Britain could ill afford. As a result of the German invasion, overwhelming numbers of Soviet soldiers and massive amounts of Soviet equipment were captured within the opening months of the campaign. The Soviets were hard pressed to slow the German advance as it blitzed across the open plains of Eastern Europe. For the most part, they had the greater weight of the German Army driving towards Moscow slowed more by logistical constraints than by Soviet resistance. By 1942, the Soviets urgently pleaded with the Western Allies (Great Britain and the Commonwealth since September of 1939 and the United States as of December 1941) to open up a second front in Europe in order to alleviate some of this pressure from the Germans. The Western Allies feared that if the Soviet Union continued to be burdened with the better part of the German Army knocking at its door, that the Soviets might capitulate and negotiate a separate peace in the East. The prospect of a separate peace was horrifying for the Western Allies. If such a agreement ever took place, the Western Allies feared that they would be incapable of having the ability to deal with the Germany Army once it had incorporated it’s troop strength from the Eastern Front into its Western Defences and North Africa. The recent memory of Russia’s concessions in the Brest-Litovsk treaty of 1917-18 had the Western Allies worried that a separate peace in the east was a very real possibility. The Western Allies knew that they did not have the resources to open any meaningful Western Front to help the Soviet Union’s dilemma. However, they could not let it appear to the Soviet Union’s leader, Joseph Stalin, that they were not doing anything to draw German strength from the Eastern Front.

        The response from the Western Allies was to create some diversions in order to convince Stalin that they were indeed doing something to bleed German troop strength. Chief among these diversions was “Operation Jubilee”, better known as the Battle for Dieppe.

        As a member of the British Commonwealth, Canada had declared war on Germany a week after England had, in September of 1939. The Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force were principally the first of Canada’s combatants to see action against the enemy, although some of Canada’s ground forces did land briefly in France in 1940, only to be evacuated almost as soon as they had disembarked . The Canadian Army’s first European land battle would be during Operation Jubilee. Jubilee was designed as a raid of the French coastal town Dieppe, which would take place in August of 1942. The fiasco at Dieppe was a large-scale raid utilizing mostly Canadian troops from the 2^nd Canadian Infantry Division.¹ It also included 50 American Rangers and both 3 and 4 Commando from the British. Collectively these elements were to be supported by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force who had allocated a total of 237 ships and almost 1,000 fighter and bomber aircraft. The raid was a military disaster insofar as achieving any of its tactical objectives. However, it would render a wealth of intelligence information. The Battle for Dieppe would cost the Canadians 3,379 men killed, captured and missing. Of these , nearly 1,000 were killed outright on the beaches. The British lost 347 men from both the Commandos and the Royal Marines while the Royal Navy lost an additional 550 men. The American Rangers lost 8 men (killed and captured) while the combined Royal and Royal Canadian Air Forces lost 122 aircraft. When all was said and done it was a stiff price to pay in order to “learn” about the Atlantic Wall’s defences. This is especially apparent in retrospect when one considers the comparatively light German losses. The Germans had lost 597 (killed or wounded) collectively from the German Army, Navy and Air Force. However, this expensive knowledge did prove invaluable for the Western Allies when they launched their amphibious assault on the Normandy coastline on the 6th of June 1944 This of course, would latter become known as D-Day.

        What the allies learned from Dieppe was simple, but vital for the later success of D-Day. The allies learned that ports were far too heavily defended and would have to be avoided. This in turn would then necessitate that the allies to provide themselves with their own artificial harbours. Necessity being the mother of invention, saw the advent of the “Mulberry”. The Mulberry was a prefabricated floating concrete box, which when linked to other Mulberry sections, formed an artificial harbour. Mulberry harbours were indispensable in bringing more troops and supplies ashore to the beachhead after D-Day.

        The allies also discovered that specialty tanks would be needed to perform a variety of tasks ranging from mine clearance, to swimming tanks, which could swim in with the troops during the beach assault. Speciality tanks would also include bridge-laying variants, which could span ditches or walls and bunker busters, which could destroy hardened enemy positions. These tanks were casually referred to as “Funnies” as most of them looked strange (or funny) in some way. The Americans perceived them as having dubious value because of their awkward appearances and the fact that they had not proven themselves in battle. The necessity for speciality vehicles learned at Dieppe was not as clear to some as it was to others, but as results would indicate on the British and Canadian D-Day beaches, they were instrumental in the success of the commonwealth landings.

        In conjunction with this, the Allies also found that there was a need for more accurate and meticulous intelligence about the proposed invasion beaches themselves. The difference of whether a sea wall was 3 or 7 feet tall made a big difference to the troops and tanks that were tasked to get over it. The number of guns and their locations was also of extreme importance. The French Resistance and many clandestine units like the British Special Boat Service regularly scoured the coastline for this type of detailed information. Valuable intelligence ranged from the composition of the actual beach itself to the number, type and position of underwater obstacles as well as the location and disposition of enemy defensive positions. Part of the problem at Dieppe was that tanks had trouble traversing the loose shingle like rocks on the beach, at times getting themselves hung up, and this was without any obstacles in the surf. Compounding this problem there were a number of hidden anti-tank gun and machine gun positions which swept the beach with fire. Knowing these types of things in advance would help the Allies find beaches, which were better suited for landings.

        As part of the effort to acquire more intelligence on the enemy held shores, a plan dating back to 1943, requested the British public to submit any pre-war pictures they had of the continental coastline. This type of intelligence would provide the allies with all sorts of details for certain parts of the occupied coast. As a result, a whole new area of study was created. This was of course photographic interpretation. This new area of study would shed light on a variety of crucial details about the occupied coastline.

        The Allies also discovered that if they wanted to even scratch the German defences in any preliminary bombardments they would need to use larger calibre guns and bombs and more of them. This also saw the advent of special bombardment vessels and the realization that damaging the enemy’s defences as much as possible before the assault went in was crucial to the success of the operation.

        With all of these lessons either freshly learned or re-emphasised, the Allies set about planning the details of Operation “Overlord”. Overlord was a design to invade occupied Europe, gain a foothold on the continent and then consolidate that foothold. This foothold would then in turn provide the Western Allies with a jumping off point with which they could later push the Germans back. D-Day, as it is commonly known was the day in which the Western allies invaded and successfully breeched Adolf Hitler’s “Fortress Europe”. It was essentially the focal point of Operation Overlord. Fortress Europe was protected by a seemingly insurmountable string of defences known as “The Atlantic Wall”. The Atlantic Wall, consisted specifically of well dug in, well prepared and well hidden static defences, which covered the coastline of Occupied France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway. It spanned from the Bay of Biscay to the Artic Ocean covering some 2,400 miles.² The defences themselves ranged from coastal guns to sandbagged machine gun nests. The Atlantic Wall was designed to fend off an invasion, sinking invasion ships and destroying any tanks or infantry that might have made it ashore. It also had its own anti-aircraft ability in addition to a few well-protected submarine pens. Camouflage, obstacles, interlocking fields of fire, observation posts, good communications and the ability to contend with airborne, sea borne and landed ground targets collectively made the Atlantic Wall the biggest defensive barrier the Allies ever had to contend with throughout the course of the Second World War.

        The invasion plan itself outlined five assault areas, which were located along the coastline of occupied France. Specifically, they were located within the area of France known as Normandy. (See Figure #1) Of these five beachheads, two were American, two were British and one was Canadian. The American beaches were referred to as Utah and Omaha, while the British beaches were called Gold and Sword . The Canadian beach would be known as Juno. All together, these beachheads would form a continuous lodgement once they became connected inland. This lodgement was the very jumping off point that Overlord sought to create. The Allied force tasked to assault the Normandy coast was 21 Army Group under the Command of British General Montgomery.³ The United States First Army, also under General Montgomery’s command, consisted of the U.S. 7th Corps tasked to Utah beach as well as the U.S. 5^th Corps tasked to Omaha. In addition Montgomery also had the British Second Army, which contained the British 30^th Corps allocated to Gold Beach. Montgomery also had the British First Corps, which saw the Canadian 3^rd Infantry Division tasked to Juno Beach and the British 3^rd Infantry Division tasked to Sword.

        The Canadians at Juno beach were located between the two British beaches, Gold and Sword. The Juno beachhead spanned from the Norman hamlet of Vaux to the town of St.Aubin-sur-mer. The Canadian objectives consisted of three phase lines as the assault pressed inland. The first two phase lines were “Yew” and “Elm”. The last phase line was called “Oak”, and it was located just past the Caen-Bayeaux highway. Phase Line Oak would be reached by June 7^th. This is worth mentioning, as the Canadian 3^rd Infantry Division would be the first out of the entire 21^st Army Group to reach its D-Day objectives.⁴

        The assaults on all of the allied beachheads were to begin early in the morning on June the 6^th 1944. The invasion of all of the intended beachheads were to be preceded by bombing and shelling by the respective allied air forces and navies just prior to the actual beach assaults. In addition, the Allies had also dropped airborne formations into Normandy to secure important bridges, cut off enemy communications and reinforcements as well as generally adding to the enemy’s state of confusion.

        At Juno Beach, H-Hour (the start time) for operations, was originally at 0735hrs, but was moved up to 0745hrs because overall the Juno landings were not collectively going as fast as they had originally been hoped for.⁵ H-Hour, was set forty four minutes before sunrise. At that time, a massive fireplan was to go into effect followed by the beach assault. Since the evening of June 5^th, heavy bombers from the United States Eighth Air Force had been pounding Omaha, Sword, Gold and Juno beaches, tapering off just as H-Hour set in. (Utah Beach was taken care of by the U.S. 9^th Airforce). Unfortunately at Juno , many of the bombs dropped past their targets. This was largely due to the fact that the bombardiers who had aimed them were using instruments to aim as opposed to sight because of the overcast weather. They plotted enough leeway so as not to drop their payloads on the incoming landing craft, but as it turned out they had overcorrected. As a result, hardly any of the fortifications were damaged or inoperable. As for the Navy, Destroyers were to open up on shore targets from H minus 45 (45 minutes before H-Hour) and follow up until the first landing craft hit the beach. 20 Batteries from the larger ships were to commence at H minus 30. Four regiments of Self-Propelled Artillery consisting of 24 105mm guns (which were still aboard landing ships), were also to open fire for the same timing. Lastly, the Landing Craft Tank (rocket) were to engage targets from H minus 10 to H minus 5.

        While Juno Beach was pounded, the 3^rd Canadian Infantry Division moved ashore in a variety of landing craft. The Canadian 7^th and 8^th Infantry Brigades were to assault the beach and the 9^th Infantry Brigade was in reserve. The 7^th Infantry Brigade consisted of the Royal Winnipeg Rifle Infantry Regiment, the Royal Regina Rifle Infantry Regiment and one company of the Canadian Scottish Infantry Regiment, (“C” Coy). The rest of the Canadian Scottish constituted the 7^th Infantry Brigades reserve. Supporting the 7^th Infantry Brigade was the 6^th Armoured Regiment - the 1^st Hussars.⁶ As for the 8^th Infantry Brigade, it was comprised of the Queens Own Rifles of Canada [Infantry] and the North Shore (New Brunswick) Infantry Regiment. They were to be supported by the 10^th Armoured Regiment - The Fort Garry Horse. The 8th Brigade’s reserve was the Regiment de la Chaudiere.⁷ In overall reserve of the 3^rd Canadian Infantry Division was the 9^th Infantry Brigade. The reserve infantry brigade was made up of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders Infantry Regiment, the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlander Infantry Regiment and the Highland Infantry of Canada Regiment. In support of the 9^th Infantry Brigade was the 27^th Armoured Regiment - The Sherbrooke Fusiliers.⁸

        In overall support of the assault elements, were a handful of specialty units employed for clearing mines, pillboxes and other obstacles.⁹ These included AVREs (Assault Vehicle Royal Engineers) from the 5^th Assault Regiment Royal Engineers and a handful of other tanks and bulldozers from the 2^nd Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment. Amongst these, were Centaur Tanks, whose 95mm Howitzers would be used to destroy enemy gun placements and fortifications at point blank range. Added to this was the support of the 12^th, 13^th, 14^th and 19^th Field Artillery Regiments of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Lastly were two squadrons of DD (Duplex Drive - swimming tanks) allotted to each Brigade sector.

        As seen on Figure #2, facing inland from right to left of the 7^th Infantry Brigade consisted of “C” Coy of the Canadian Scottish Regiment, and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles Regiment with “A” Squadron of the 1^st Hussars in support. These would land on “Mike” beach - sector “Green” and sector “Red”. Next were the Royal Regina Rifles who had “B” Squadron of the 1^st Hussars in support. Both of these units would land on “Nan” beach - sector “Green”.¹⁰

        Next to the 7^th Infantry Brigade was the 8^th Infantry Brigade, who landed the Queens Own Rifles of Canada on “Nan” beach - sector “White” with “B” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse in support. Following them, were the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment who would land on “Nan” beach - sector “Red”. They in turn, were supported by “A” Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse Armoured Regiment.¹¹

        Opposing the 3^rd Canadian Infantry Division’s assault at Juno Beach, was the German 716^th Infantry Division. The 716^th was a static formation, meaning it was designated to hold largely immobile positions and weapons to defend the coast. All ranks added up to some 7,771 men, roughly half of the number of Canadians that would land within their area of operations.¹² It contained two Infantry Regiments, the 726^th and the 736^th. The 716^th Infantry Division also had several elements of the 21^st Panzer Division in its operating area and under its command (two Panzer Grenadier Battalions and the Divisional Anti-Tank Battalion).¹³ In support of the German 716^th Infantry Division, were three battalions of divisional artillery, which was made up of a mixture of guns captured from the French, Poles, Czechs and Russians. From its Heavy Battalion of Artillery, only one Battery of Guns was of a “larger” 155mm calibre. The 716th Infantry Division also had access to some of the 21^st Panzer Division’s Guns, which added up to another three batteries, but these were mobile and mostly of 105mm calibre. The 716^th Infantry Division had relatively no armour to speak of and all of the armoured elements of the 21^st Panzer Division were north of the French City of Caen. The beach defences themselves were not quite so regimented in their organization. Instead, beach defences largely added up to a numerous series of resistance nests interspersed with more organised elements of the 716^th. Collectively, these defences composed of a wide variety of weapons from machine guns and anti-tank guns to coastal batteries. While the bulk of the defences were sighted seaward and able to support the beaches themselves, there were also numerous guns and defensive positions sighted more inland to stop a breakthrough. The coastal area defended by the 716^th was also heavily sewn with mines of all types as well as a variety of obstacles, many of which had to be contended with right on the beaches themselves. However, most of these assets were mobile and could be sent elsewhere if needed. The troops of the 716^th themselves, were considered by their overall army Group commander (Field Marshal General Gerd Von Rundstedt), to be a “better than average static division…[and]…completely fit for defence”.¹⁴ It should be noted however, that while other allied beaches were defended by higher quality troops (like those of the German 352^nd Infantry Division), the 716^th was by no means a token formation. In addition to the “better than average” troops of the 716^th, the defences that they manned, would also prove to be very well constructed, in addition to being well sighted and in some cases well camouflaged.¹⁵ Routing the German 716^th Infantry Division out of its defences was no easy task, and as history would prove, the men of the 716^th would make a good account of themselves on D-Day being responsible for some 961 Canadian, and 243 British casualties on Juno Beach.¹⁶ This was the second highest number of allied (beachhead) casualties on D-Day next only to the 2,200 men killed at the Omaha Beachhead. To put this into perspective, the British took 413 casualties at Gold Beach, 630 at Sword and 800 in their airborne drops while the Americans took 197 casualties at Utah and another 2,500 for their combined airborne drops from both the 82^nd and 101^st Airborne Divisions. Collectively, there were about 8,500 allied casualties on D-Day alone. Alternately, the Germans have no specific numbers of casualties for the 716^th infantry division on D-Day, other than to indicate that 80% of their infantry strength was lost on June 6th 1944. This left the 716^th with one battalion of infantry, which had already taken 20% casualties and only 20% of its original artillery complement. By the 9^th of June, only 292 men of all ranks from the 716^th were to be counted.¹⁷

        The evening of June 6^th 1944 marks the decisive turning point, which drew the European Theatre of World War Two to a conclusion. Across the coast of Normandy the respective allied beachheads began to link up to form one continuous lodgement. It is from here that the Allies consolidated their toehold and began preparations to push the Germans back. This push began in the days that followed D-Day and ended on May 4^th 1945 with the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany to the Allies.

        D-Day was crucial for the allied success in the European theatre of Operations. From their lodgement in Normandy, the Western Allies would press inland, slowly pushing the Germans back up against the oncoming Soviet Red Army. Canada’s involvement on D-Day and the Normandy Campaign while frequently played down or outright forgotten about, played no small role in the success of Operation Overlord. At places like Dieppe, Canada had paid the price for many of the lessons learned, which proved indispensable to the success of D-Day. Moreover, Canada’s contributions from D-Day and its drive inland were just as noteworthy, but that is material for a different discussion.