Section Leaders:
Fionn Kelly & Madmatt

Soviet Tank Development (part 4)
by: Fionn Kelly

  Parts 1-4 in downloadable PRINTABLE .doc format! 

Part 4. The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945

         As may be discerned from the previous section, on the eve of war, the Soviet armoured-tank and mechanised troops were to be found in a process of extensive reorganization and rearmament.  The mechanised corps were not fully established with regards to both equipment and personnel.  The tanks with which they were equipped were mostly out of date, and the new KV and T-34 tanks deployed in the Western military districts totaled only about 1,500.

         The pre-war theory for the utilization of armoured-tank and mechanised troops once more became the basis for operations.  It was considered fundamental to develop the offensive in great depth and at a rate of up to 80 km per day by acting in the operative depth of the enemy defences.  The Soviets state, however, that it was extremely difficult for them to apply this theory practically when under conditions of an enforced strategic withdrawal.

         During the first phase of the war, the Soviet armoured forces suffered huge losses (lowest estimate 17,500 - highest 24,000 tanks).  The reasons for this are extremely varied and complex, and to provide a clear picture it would be necessary to go into a lengthy, protracted discussion.  Nevertheless, on the tank side, a few critical points may be expounded upon to give some idea of the general situation.

           In the first instance, the Soviet armoured forces were at the beginning of an overall rearmament cycle.  The bulk of their equipment had been designed in 1931-32 with the contemporary level of technology, and to conform to the general philosophy of tank warfare at that time.  This equipment was in a process of replacement when the Germans attacked, and as such, was in a poor state of mechanical repair and care.

           Secondly, the organizational, tactical and operational procedures of the Soviet armoured forces also were in a state of major upheaval, resulting from a re-alignment to the large tank formations.  At the time when the Germans attacked, many Soviet units were in transit, often separated from their equipment, and few really knew where they were meant to go.  Even the General Staff had no idea where some of the units were, or even destined for.

            Thirdly, the Great Purge of 1937-38 had greatly weakened both the Soviet Officer Corps and the nucleus of professional and experienced men.  Rapid field promotions resulted, and many tank crews had only a few hours' gunnery or driving experience, and officers had barely more.

            Fourthly, and very significantly, the Army had been given a blanket order from the highest levels of command (Stalin) for "No Provocation!"  Reports of sudden German attacks from the front on June 22, 1941, were interpreted as "incidents" designed to provoke the Russians.  It was not until whole brigades or corps had actually been committed, that the High Command began to take matters seriously.  By then it was too late.  Invariably large sections of the Army had been encircled or out-manoeuvred.  Fuel and ammunition depots, located in the border districts, had been overrun and a large quantity of vehicles destroyed or captured.

            During the first days of the war, the mechanised corps deployed in the western border districts became engaged in fierce encounter battles with the German panzer divisions.  Two of these corps were then deployed in the Baltic, five in the Western, and eight in the Kiev Military Districts.  They were either being phased into combined arms armies, or remained under the direct jurisdiction of the district commander. 

          In accordance with their training, they attempted to insert counter-thrusts upon the main enemy groups that were penetrating into the depths of Russia.  Some of these counter-thrusts were effective, but most were not.  One mechanised corps on the South-Western Front, engaged in a fierce battle with the German lst Tank Group, succeeded in delaying its advance in the Zhitomir-Kiev direction by several days.  After the first counter-thrusts, the mechanised corps were ordered to pass over to the defensive, in co-operation with the rifle troops (infantry).

            Had the Soviet Army been at a higher state of preparedness, and been allowed to develop, over time, greater tactical awareness and knowledge of the realities of fast-moving combat as it would occur during those nightmare years, it might have repelled the German attacks by "spoiling actions" or surprise counter-attacks. 

          By virtue of not having clearly defined offensive or defensive grouping of forces, it was simply not prepared for any such operations. Combined-arms formations and units at that time lacked sufficient strength and experience to provide an effective defence or to effectively resist massed attacks by large groups of tanks.

           Under these circumstances, most of the mechanised corps had been assigned missions of carrying out counter-attacks with the object of destroying one or more of the enemy's groups of forces, and to win time for organising a stable defence.  They seldom achieved their aims for a variety of reasons, including lack of opportunity to lay on missions (of which many were clearly beyond their capabilities), lack of intelligence on the situation, lack of co-ordination and a general paucity of command capability.

            Attempts were made by several corps to carry out co-ordinated counterattacks.  This type of operation, however, required strategic formations of tank forces having well-trained staffs and effective means of control which were non-existent in the Red Army at that time.  Not having sufficient time to organize counter-attacks, and lacking in firm control by senior commanders, the mechanised corps acted as separate units under the most complex and unfavourable of circumstances.  Furthermore, within the formations and corps there was no clear-cut co-ordination of operations.  Reconnaissance was often poorly conducted, without steps being taken to ensure march and combat security.  The handling of POL and ammunition also left much to be desired.

            During these critical operations, Soviet tank units and formations usually operated as follows.  Sub-units equipped with KVs and T-34s were, as a rule, located in the forward echelon, and were assigned the task of destroying the enemy's PzKpfw III and IV tanks as well as his anti-tank guns.  Sub-units equipped with BT and T-26 tanks, making up the second echelon, were deployed against the motorised infantry, armoured carriers and artillery.

            Due to the rapidity of the German advance, which threatened the great tank plants in Western Russia, the latter had to be evacuated to the east-principally to the Urals.  As a result, the tremendous losses of the early part of the war could not be compensated for until this industry had been rebuilt and was back in full-swing production.  This led to a very serious condition developing on the front lines where tanks lost in combat were not being replaced by newly constructed models. It is true to say that if the Soviet Union had lost just 1,000 more tanks in the autumn of 1941, the course of the winter fighting and the whole of the Second World War could have been very, very different.

            Following these tremendous losses in tanks, on July 15, 1941, the General Headquarters made a fundamental decision.  As a result, the small quantity of tanks still in service with the fronts was now used only for direct co-operation with the infantry.  Here, the tanks were used to operate from ambush, to bolster up the infantry in the defence, and for special counter-attacks.  These changes in the methods of using tanks necessitated organisational changes to the armoured-tank troops.

          From autumn 1941 all mechanised corps and tank divisions (what was left of them) were disbanded.  The tank units were assembled into separate formations and assigned to army commanders.  Motorised rifle divisions became pure rifle divisions.  According to Soviet sources, on December 1, 1941, there were only 1,984 tanks deployed with the field army.  Under these conditions, the basic organisational units for armoured-tank troops became separate tank brigades and separate tank battalions.

          In the battles that developed during autumn and winter 1941, these were used only for executing tactical, as opposed to operational, tasks, both in defence and in the attack. While this limited their losses, it was also a fundamental departure from Soviet pre-war doctrine

            According to the Soviets, the absence of large armoured-tank formations in the Soviet Army at that time limited its ability to develop tactical successes in operations and to conduct fast offensives.  They provide this as one of the reasons for the failure to exploit certain winter offensives, particularly that at Moscow.  This is partly true, but overriding factors were the inexperience on the part of the Soviet High Command, the lack of experienced and well-trained officers at the lower echelons, and the shortage of military transport.

            Once more applying their pre-war concepts for the use of tanks, the Soviets maintained that "the decisive and mobile nature of operations demanded both the operative-tactical and organisational massing of armoured-tank troops." At the end of 1941, the Battle for Moscow appeared to both sides to be one of the most important of the entire war, which it was.

           Appointed as commander of the Soviet troops at Moscow, was G.K. Zhukov.  Zhukov was given personal authority by Stalin to concentrate practically the entire Soviet tank force at Moscow.  These forces, now somewhat enlarged through the arrival of new tanks from the Eastern factories, but even more so by the release of a large number of troops and equipment from the Special Far Eastern Red Banner Army, had the opportunity to apply this theory.

            During the defensive stage of the battle, the Soviets employed novel methods of combating numerically superior enemy tank forces, such as the tank ambush.  It was essentially this, in the defensive sector of a tank brigade of the first echelon a reinforced motorised battalion was deployed.  Under cover of an outpost, it organised a defensive area which appeared to be real, having a false MLR (main line of resistance) and dummy antitank guns, machine-guns and mortar positions.  The real MLR and firing positions were carefully camouflaged.

        The fire-plan having been established, manoeuvre by on the most likely route of advance by the enemy was planned, as were numerous fire sacks.  In the second echelon, areas were chosen for tank ambushes, which were individually echeloned in depth and had flank positions in relation to the most likely route of advance of enemy tanks.  In the ambush itself there was usually a tank platoon, at times however, there might only be two or even one tank. Commanders of battalions and brigades held a tank group in reserve to counter unforeseen attacks. The critical approach route was mined.

           As can be readily imagined, this form of defence served to maximise the amount of time the enemy must spend clearing routes through the defensive zones, minimised the danger to the Soviet tanks, and gave them the opportunity to fire and withdraw without becoming too endangered by enemy fire.

            Prior to committing his tanks to the attack, the enemy would lay down an artillery preparation.  Most of his concentrations in this case fell on the false position.

            Motorised rifle sub-units usually allowed the attacking tanks to pass right through their positions so as to cut off and destroy the infantry advancing behind them.  Vehicles were destroyed individually by anti-tank grenades and Molotov cocktails from close range while tanks that had penetrated deep into the defences were destroyed by the surprise flanking fire of the tank ambush, at a range of about 200 to 300 metres.

            Having defeated the enemy from one position, the tanks in the ambush quickly transferred to another position to avoid losses from artillery fire and air strikes. The unexpected and effective Soviet fire caused a certain amount of disorder amongst the enemy troops, and disrupted their plan of attack.  They were under the impression that there was a considerably larger force opposing them than there actually was.

            In defensive battles, the basic strength of the tank brigades and battalions was located within the combat formations of rifle units on critical paths of tank approach.  A proportion of the tanks, however, occupied positions in combination with anti-tank artillery, rifle, and engineer units in anti-tank strongpoints and positions.  There were occasions when motorised rifle and tank divisions carried out independent missions in co-operation with rifle and cavalry units.

            During the counter-offensive at Moscow, some 20 tank brigades and about the same number of battalions were deployed.  The main emphasis was placed on the infantry forces; nevertheless, very important missions were carried out by the tank troops.  In order to develop the success, improvised mobile groups were created and made organic to certain tank brigades and cavalry formations of a number of combined-arms armies. Although these ad hoc groups never approached the strategic force which the corps could have been if committed to battle at the same point in time, they were relatively effective given the state of Soviet forces at the time.

            Operating in close co-operation with the infantry, NPP tanks provided the means of manoeuvre that successfully turned the German flanks, and forced them to withdraw from important lines of defence. Tanks were often employed in the group of forces of forward detachments, which were sent forward to seize vital objectives or escape routes along the enemy's line of withdrawal.

            The role of tanks when deployed in mobile groups is of interest.  For example, during the Volokolamsk offensive, two mobile groups were formed by the Commander of the 16th Army:  the first group from the 145th Tank Brigade, the 44th Cavalry Division and the 17th Rifle Brigade; the second from the lst Guards and 17th Tank Brigades, the 89th Tank Battalion and the 40th Rifle Brigade.  Turning the enemy's flanks at an inward position, they then threatened envelopment, forcing him to begin a withdrawal.  Pursuing the enemy, mobile group raced ahead and, through harsh fighting, managed to free Volokolamsk.  Despite lessons learned, and the improvements in command tactics, the Soviets continued to make mistakes.

            They still tended to allocate tanks equally between rifle units (as the result of inadequate intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain), which made it impossible to mass tanks along the main advance routes. They attempted to deeply echelon tanks in direct infantry support, which resulted in a deterioration of the striking and firepower capabilities at the very tip of the attack while huge reserves followed up behind.  The United States of America made much the same mistake in 1944 when the number of Shermans committed to front-line units was only 33% of those in survival at any one time.  The others were in storage, reserve or shipping. 

          In the offensive, tanks would often move too far ahead of the infantry and artillery, and they would be forced to return to them (sometimes several times during a day), thereby suffering unnecessary losses.  Subsequently, the General Staff stipulated that tanks in a direct infantry support role should not advance further than 400 metres ahead of their accompanying infantry.

            Experience gained by the Soviet troops during the counter-offensive before Moscow, and in the other offensive operations of winter 1941-42, was carefully analyzed.  Based on this analysis, the General Headquarters at first issued a directive and then (on January 22, 1942) an order, in which was presented a thorough analysis of past battles, highlighting deficiencies and suggesting methods of avoiding them. 

        On a broad level, the experience convinced the Soviet High Command of the validity of one of the most fundamental principles of their pre-war theory.  This was that, 'for the successful execution of an offensive to a great depth and at a fast rate, in addition to separate tank units for co-operation with the infantry, it is necessary to have available large armoured-tank formations organic to the attacking troops, and intended for independent actions.'

        The execution of this principle in practice, however, required a large number of tanks.  For this reason the greatest priority was placed on tank production.  As a result 24,668 tanks were produced during 1942, with 50.8 percent being T-34s.  According to official Soviet documents, the number of tanks deployed in the operative armies was 4,959 in May 1942, and 6,956 in November 1942.  Apart from the T-34 and KV tanks, production of the T-60 and T-70 tanks was continued. 

        This was not by choice, since the Soviets had already become convinced of the ineffectiveness of the light tank.  However, T-60s and T-70s could be produced at a faster rate, and therefore rendered great assistance to the rifle troops who would have otherwise been left without any tanks at all.  With the growth in production of medium tanks, however, delivery of T-60s and T-70s to the troops was discontinued, and existing vehicles were converted to self-propelled weapons and armoured support vehicles.

       In the meantime, the directive stipulated that separate tank battalions and brigades should be employed in full strength, and in close co-operation with infantry, artillery and the air arm.  Tanks should not be committed to battle without prior intelligence as to the disposition of the enemy and without reconnaissance of the terrain on which an action was, to take place.  The artillery was expected to carry out artillery offensives in support of the front line troops, which included artillery preparations for an attack, artillery support during the attack, and the availability of artillery fire to forces advancing deep into the enemy's defences.

            By the spring of 1942, the increased production of tanks allowed the creation of tank corps.  Mechanised corps also began to be formed in the autumn.  This was not, however, a return to the old corps organisation. 

        The tank corps had three tank and one motor-rifle brigades and incorporated 168 tanks.  The tank and mechanised brigades, now having the very latest equipment, formed the corps organisational basis. 

        The mechanised corps comprised three mechanised and one tank brigades and had 175 tanks.  During this period, operational units of tank forces were being mobilised - the tank armies.  At first there were two, and these differed little from combined arms armies.  At the end of 1942, the Soviets also began to form heavy-tank regiments.

            The first two tank armies (the 3rd and the 5th), formed in April-May 1942, were of mixed composition and comprised tank corps, rifle divisions, cavalry formations, artillery and mortar units, and various supporting sub-units.  In the view of the Soviet High Command they were intended for independently breaking through prepared enemy defences and for developing the success in operations.

            The tank corps and tank armies were used for the first time during the summer of 1942.  Amongst other operations, they participated in the Kharkov operation on the South-Western Front where the Soviet Army was conducting defensive actions; during the battle on the Bryansk Front; on the Voronezh Front, and on the avenues of approach to Stalingrad.

        During the early days, with lack of experience, the Soviets made many mistakes in deploying these corps and armies.  At times they were committed to battle at the wrong moment, or given assignments outside of the unit's capabilities, or were thrown into battle piecemeal rather than together. 

       There was still a lack of experience on the part of the command nucleus and staff.  This was evident when planning and organizing combat operations at short notice, when controlling forces during meeting engagements or under rapidly changing and complex conditions, and inadequate co-ordination of action within their own combat elements and with respect to other combat and supporting arms.

         Drastic measures were taken in an attempt to eliminate these deficiencies.  Command cadres, staffs and large numbers of tank crews had to be trained forthwith.  This was successfully carried out, but was a painful process which always took too long, and whose delays were paid for in blood by the front-line soldiers.  The manoeuvrability and mobility of the units improved, and their aptitude for tactical and operational coordinated action with other combat arms and services also increased.

          Awareness of these errors, coupled with the combat experience gained during the 1942 battles, enabled the Soviet High Command to determine new principles for utilising the corps in future battles and operations, and these were set out in NKO Order No 325, dated October 16 1942.  According to this, separate tank brigades and regiments were to be used for the direct support of infantry, and tank and mechanised corps were to be made available to fronts.

        Tank armies were to be reserved for use along the main direction as, "echelons for the development of the success".  These were to insert powerful thrusts with the aim of cutting off and encircling large enemy groups. Which were later to be invested by the following infantry and cavalry forces

            The basic points of the order were put into practice during the counter-offensive at Stalingrad.  In this battle the armoured-tank and mechanised troops became the basic thrust force of the land troops. 15 tank and mechanised corps were used in this operation, and during the course of the counter offensive they were used as echelons for the development of the success by the Soviet Army, attacking along the main direction. 

        They were usually introduced into battle during the first day of an offensive to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defences, once the initial infantry-led assault had made some progress but was beginning to falter.  If successful, the corps swarmed independently of the combined arms formations into the operative depth of the enemy defences, often penetrating from 100-240 km.  Wise German commanders used this eagerness of the Soviet Command against them, and allowed the Soviets to sprawl large tank forces throughout the depth of the German rear where, unsupplied and unsupported, they were easily destroyed by concentrated, mobile German tank-infantry battle-groups.

            After overcoming the tactical zone of defences, the tank and mechanised corps directed their main effort towards a swift penetration into the depth of the enemy defences.  The average daily rate of advance by the corps when developing the success was put at 30-35 km, and the maximum reached 60-70 km.

            In the meantime, the basis for operational and tactical employment of tank forces was reflected in their new organisational structure.  To reinforce rifle formations, it was decided to use separate tank brigades and regiments.  These were employed as groups, having direct infantry support roles (NPP).  Separate regiments, however, equipped with heavy tanks, were intended mainly for combating enemy tanks and self-propelled artillery.

            Separate tank brigades usually consisted of three tank and a motorised (rifle) battalions, an artillery battalion, a combat-engineer company, an anti-aircraft battery, and sub-units for combat security and technical supply.  There were 65 tanks in a brigade, but there were other variations in tank brigade organisation.

            As a rule, separate tank regiments consisted of five tank and one mechanised rifle companies, an artillery battery and other combat security and technical supply units.

            Following the battle on the Volga, the tank and mechanised corps were used on a wide scale and played an important part in the winter 1942-43 campaigns.  In these operations, several corps were utilised for developing the operative success along the main direction.  The co-ordination between these corps, however, left much to be desired, principally as the result of a inefficient administrative and supply organisation.

       It was in the operations of the winter of 1942-43, that the tank armies were used.  These were massive, armoured tank organisations that were powerful, highly manoeuvrable operative units.  Experience with the heterogeneous tank armies showed, however, that such a structure did not allow them to conduct operations of manoeuvre.  It had been found that the army commanders could not direct their troops clearly, nor could they maintain continuous inter-co-operation between the various formations with their differing mobility's.

        In January 1943, the Soviet High Command agreed on the decision to form homogeneous tank armies.  Within that year, five tank armies of this type were formed, comprised of one to two tank corps and one mechanised corps as well as supporting units.  From here on, an army establishment included a light artillery brigade, an anti-tank artillery division and other units. 

       In January 1944, the 6th Tank Army was formed.  The fighting establishment of a tank army amounted to 600-700 tanks and SPs, 500-600 guns and mortars, and 305,000 men.  When attached to a front, tank armies were used as echelons for the development of the success during the offensive, and as a powerful means of inflicting counter-thrusts in defence.  This is a clear evolution of earlier Soviet tactical thought.

       Throughout 1943, the organizational forms of the other types of armoured tank troops were improved.  The combat establishments of the tank and mechanised corps were increased as the result of the inclusion of self-propelled artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft units, liaison sub-units and engineers.  The tank corps totaled 207 tanks and 63 SPs, whilst the mechanised had 183 tanks and 63 SPs.  They were composed only of medium tanks.

        For reinforcing their infantry elements, the Soviets used separate tank brigades, tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, and heavy-tank regiments.

        At this time, the basic type of tank remained the T-34 medium tank, which was re-armed with the 85mm gun (T-34-85).  Towards the end of 1943, the Soviet tank industry began to turn out the Iosef Stalin heavy tank (IS-I), and production began of several types of self-propelled artillery mounting-the SU-76, 85, 100 and the ISU-122, 152.

            When using NPP tanks to break through enemy defences, the Soviets continued to maintain strict central control in the hands of the rifle division commander.  It was only towards the end of 1944, and in 1945, when the number of NPP tanks had increased considerably, that it was possible to parcel out tank units to rifle regiments and battalions.

            In general, the co-ordinated use of tanks in a direct infantry support role, alongside infantry, artillery and engineers, greatly improved.  The Field Service Regulations issued during 1943, in which precise directions for the combat employment of tanks in an infantry support (NPP) role were defined, greatly facilitated the improvement of this co-operative action.

            In 1943, the Soviets still lacked experience in the use of the new tank armies, and most of the army commanders were consulted for their opinions over this.  After combining all these opinions, the Soviet High Command decided the basic method for using tank armies at the start of offensive operations would be as follows: "they should be introduced for the breakthrough after the rifle formations have overcome the main defensive zone or all the tactical defensive zones of the enemy."  It was concluded that, following this, a swift operation by the army should be carried out in the operative depth, in co-operation with aircraft and isolated from the main force.

            In July 1943, the active army possessed 9,918 tanks and self-propelled guns, which gave it a distinct numerical superiority over that of the Germans.

            During the Battle of Kursk, all five tank armies took part, as well as 15 separate tank and mechanised corps and many separate tank brigades and regiments.  In the defence, separate tank and self-propelled artillery units operated in close co-operation with the infantry and were made organic to the rifle formations. 

        Tank armies and separate tank corps were used for two main roles: firstly, to hold prepared defensive zones either in co-operation with, or independent of, combined arms armies, and secondly, for inserting powerful counter-thrusts.  Once the Soviets moved over to the offensive, the armoured-tank troops were used to conduct wide sweeping movements.

            Three tank armies (3rd Guards, 2nd and 4th) operated in the Orlovsk direction, in combination with seven separate tank corps.  These operations were, however, not very mobile due to the nature of the enemy defences, and the tank armies could not achieve a fast rate of advance.  They did, however, provide great force to the advancing fronts by storming numerous defensive positions.

            The operations by the two tank armies in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (5th Guards and lst), co-operating with seven separate corps, took on a different character.  As at the Battle of Stalingrad, the separate corps were used as echelons for the development of the successes by combined-arms armies, and the two tank armies likewise for the Voronezh Front.  For the first time, the tank armies were used here to break through the tactical zone of defences, and then to swiftly develop the offensive.  By the fifth day of the offensive, they had sheered the enemy group and facilitated its subsequent encirclement.

            During the final period of the war, the quantity of armoured vehicles available increased tremendously.  At the beginning of 1944, the active army disposed of 5,357 tanks and SPs.  Despite huge losses at Kursk and in the Ukraine, from June 1944 the tank park of the active army was brought up to 7,753 tanks and SPs and, by January 1945, to 12,900 tanks and SPs.

            During the initial operations of 1944, the Soviet Army inserted a main thrust into the Ukraine.  Here all six tank armies were used together with eight separate tank and mechanised corps and a considerable number of separate tank brigades and regiments.  With this mass of troops and equipment they formed powerful 'front mobile groups' which accelerated the achievements of successes. This doctrinal usage was adopted in part by the Warsaw pact, whose Operational Manouvre Groups of Red Storm Rising fame are direct linear descendants of this concept.

            During 1944, a main thrust was inserted by the Soviet Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German Front-in Belorussia and the Western Ukraine.  The basic mass of the tank troops was used here, comprising five tank armies, ten separate tank and mechanised corps and several scores of separate brigades and regiments.  The corps and armies created echelons for the development of the success by armies and fronts respectively.  To develop the successes of these fronts, horse-cavalry/mechanised groups were set up.  In these operations, the offensive was carried to depths of 350-550 km.

          From December 1944 on, guards heavy tank brigades of the Supreme Command Reserve (RVGK) were activated for use in supporting forces when breaking through enemy tactical defence zones.  They increased the penetrative capability of advancing forces and the stability of co-ordinated operations.

            The next phase was the thrust from the Vistula to the Oder in January 1945.  Here the Soviet High Command deployed the largest-ever mass of armoured-tank troops: four tank armies, five separate tank and one mechanised corps (16 corps altogether), six separate tank and two self-propelled artillery brigades, and 23 tank and 41 self-propelled artillery regiments.  Altogether, these comprised some 7,500 tanks and SPs.  Within 22 days, the Soviet troops had moved forward from the Vistula to the Oder, a distance of over 600 km.

            During the subsequent battle for Berlin, 6,000 tanks and SPs were massed.  On the active sector four tank armies were deployed; two of these (3rd and 4th Guards), after taking Berlin, moved swiftly to Prague where they joined with the 6th Guards Tank Army in the 'liberation' of the city.

            The final armoured operation by the Russians in this war was that for the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria.  The bulk of the units were made organic to the Transbaikal Front which inserted a main thrust across the Great Khingan mountain range into the central region of Manchuria.  The 6th Tank Army was deployed in the first operative echelon of the front together with other tank formations.  Their appearance in the rear of the Japanese Army made a great contribution to its final defeat.  In fact, this was probably the fastest land operation in military history.