Section Leaders:
Fionn Kelly & Madmatt

Soviet Tank Development (part 3)
by: Fionn Kelly

Part 3. 1937- June 1941 (4^th 5 Year Plan)

On November 28, 1937, a plan was approved for the development and reconstruction of the Red Army over the period 1938-1941, the Fourth Five-Year Plan.  Therein no increase in the number of tank formations was envisaged; to be retained were four corps, 21 separate tank brigades, three separate armoured brigades and, in place of a cadre brigade, 11 tank (training) regiments were to be formed. 

The combat element of the brigade, however, was strengthened considerably by changing over from three to five-tank platoons.  The light tank brigade, on establishment, comprised 278 BT tanks, and T-26-equipped brigades had 267 tanks.  Heavy brigades had, on establishment, 183 tanks (of which 136 were T-28s, 37 BTs, and ten flame-throwing), and T-35 brigades - 148 tanks (of which 94 were T-35s, 44 BTs and ten flame-throwing).

Tank regiments were intended to have from 190 to 267 tanks, the establishment varying with availability, military district and tank types in the regiment.

In the establishment of each rifle division, tank battalions of twin-company composition were introduced (T-26 and T-28), and in each cavalry division a tank regiment.

In accordance with the plan, in 1938 the armoured-tank troops received a new organisation and steps were made to unify all tank units under one command.  With a view to this aim, the unnecessary divisions in nomenclature between mechanised and tank units were abolished and henceforth these unit types were ALL referred to as "TANK" formations.  Brigades having BT and T-26 tanks were called light-tank, and those with T-28 and T-35 heavy tank. 

On establishment, light-tank brigades comprised four tank battalions with 54 standard (gun) and six artillery tanks (armed with 76.2mm guns) per battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a motor-rifle battalion and supply sub-units.  In brigades equipped with T-28 and T-35 tanks, the platoons consisted of three tanks.  Accordingly, the mechanised corps was renamed the tank corps.  Tank brigades, comprising the corps, received the same organisational structure as the separate light-tank brigades.

The combat operations in which the Red Army participated during 1938 and 1939 revealed certain deficiencies in troop organisation. (The tank troops experienced a partial examination during the battles with the Japanese at Lake Khasan during 1938 and on the River Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, and also during the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40.) The continual increases in anti-tank means for the defence brought about changes in the views on the combat use of tanks with infantry during the offensive. 

In order to study these factors and to provide recommendations for their improvement, in July 1939 the Main Military Council set up a commission under the chairmanship of G.1. Kulik, Deputy Commissar for Defence, which sat from August 8-22, 1939.  During discussions over the organisation of the tank troops, a controversy developed in connection with the opinions of Chief of the Auto-Armoured Directorate, Corps Commander D.G. Pavlov. 

Pavlov commented on the unsuitability of retaining the tank corps.  He argued on the experience of combat in Spain, of which he was a participant, that the use of corps for "raiding" in the enemy rear was impermissible since it excluded such a possibility as breaking through an enemy front.  Here it would be impossible, he said, to develop the success using the cumbersome tank corps (according to the 1938 establishment the corps was intended to have 560 tanks and 12,710 men).  Apart from this, for success in any offensive operation, tanks needed strong infantry, artillery and aviation support.  The tank corps commander, in his opinion, could never manipulate all of these means in strength.

 The majority of the members of the committee, however, voted in favour of retaining the corps.  The commission advocated two types of tank brigade: for independent action brigades equipped with BT tanks; and for reinforcing rifle troops brigades equipped with T-26 and T-28 tanks.  During November 1939, the Main Military Council considered the proposals of the commission, but nevertheless agreed on the necessity of disbanding the tank corps and the machine-gun brigades organic to the corps.

This decision may be taken as the greatest blunder in Soviet military history. Almost immediately after the disaster following the German attack on June 22, 1941, Pavlov was shot as a sop to Stalin's guilt about going along with the disbanding of the corps.  Regardless of this decision, certain important factors ought to be taken into account. 

Mention has already been made concerning the difficulties of liaison and communication.  Before giving its decision, the Main Military Council (chaired by Iosef Stalin himself) examined thoroughly the experience gained with the corps during the Russo-Finnish War, and even more recently during the march by the Red Army into the western regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine in September 1939.  In this latter campaign two corps took part, the 15th Tank (from the Belorussian Military District) and the 25th Tank (Ukrainian Military District).  The commanders of these corps found great difficulty in directing their subordinate brigades, as the result of which the corps even lagged behind the cavalry divisions.

The breaking-down of the corps was, on Soviet admission, a retrograde step in the evolution of the tank forces.  As a matter of fact, it was a drastic departure from the basic principles of combat and operations in depth.  Not only was the possibility of using large, centralised masses of armour removed, but it became extremely difficult to instill any clarity of purpose and standardization of tactical and operational thought in the training of commanders and staffs for operational-scale missions.

In a directive dated November 21, 1939, the Main Military Council ordered the replacement of the corps by motorised divisions (with the disbanding of the corps the tank brigade represented the highest armoured echelon).  It was planned to form 15 motorised divisions, eight in 1940 and seven during the first half of 1941. 

On establishment, the division was scheduled to have 258 BT tanks and 17 T-37/T-40 light amphibious tanks, making a total of 275 (20 of these being in the divisional reserve), 11,650 men, 98 guns and mortars (over 50mm calibre) and 49 armoured cars.  It was to be made up of two motor-rifle, one tank and one artillery regiments; reconnaissance, liaison and light engineer battalions; divisional anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and also supply units.  The directive foresaw re-equipping the tank troops with the new T-34 tanks in place of the BT-7s and much of its thought was based on the tactical-technical characteristics of the T-34 and not the BT series which was rapidly passing out of favour at that time.

The organisation of a motorised division was a better prospect than that of the earlier existing corps.  The motorised division was intended for use as an echelon to develop the successes of combined-arms armies and also for integration into the horsed-cavalry mechanised groups.

Alongside the motorised divisions, tank brigades were also to be retained for reinforcing corps.  Altogether, it was planned to have 32 brigades and ten tank regiments, to be developed into brigades during wartime.  Thereby BT and T-26 brigades, on establishment, were intended to have 258 tanks, and T-28 and T-35 brigades, 156 tanks.

In 1940 motorised divisions began to be organised.  By May of that year four had been formed.  During June 1940, in the Narkomate for Defence, an examination was conducted on the experiences of combat operations by German troops in the west, the results of which were reported to Stalin.  On his orders the decision was taken to form, in the Red Army, mechanised corps comprising 1,000 to 1,200 tanks.  In other words this was almost a complete reversal of the directive issued during December 1939.

 A corps was intended to have two tank divisions, a motorised division of the December 5^th 1939 establishment, a motorcycle regiment, separate liaison and motorised engineer battalions, and also an aviation squadron.  The tank division was to be composed of two tank, one motor-rifle and one artillery regiments and various sub-units for combat and material supply.  The division was envisaged to have 11,343 men, 413 tanks (of which 105 were to be KVs, 210 T-34s, 26 BT-7s, 18 T-26s and 54 flame-throwing), 91 armoured cars, and 58 guns and mortars (over 50mm calibre). 

The motorised division incorporated two motorised, one tank, and one artillery regiments, together with various support elements.  The total corps table of organisation called for between 1,025 and 1,108 tanks, 126 of which were KVs, 420 T-34s, and the remainder either BT-7s or T-26s.  The total wartime strength was put at 37,200 men (a level which few were at prior to war).

Through a resolution by the Council of People's Commissars dated July 6, 1940, these organisations for mechanised corps and the tank division were accepted.  In the Red Army it was planned to have eight corps and two separate tank divisions.

During the second half of 1940, on the basis of a number of rifle and cavalry corps organisations having motorised, cavalry and rifle divisions and tank brigades, there began to be formed:

·        in the Leningrad Military District, the l^st Mechanised Corps;

·        in the Western Special Military District, the 3^rd and 6^th;

·        in the Kiev Special Military District, the 4^th and 8^th;

·        in Odessa, the 2^nd;

·        in the Transbaikal, the 5^th;

·        in the Moscow district, the 7^th;

·        in the Transcaucasus and Central-Asian districts each one independent tank division (6th and 9th respectively);

·        in the Kiev Special Military, the 9^th Mechanised Corps.

At the beginning of 1941, the organisation of the tank regiment in the tank division was revised with respect to decreasing the quantity of heavy tanks from 52 to 31.  Accordingly, this decreased the number of tanks in the division from 413 to 375.  It was with this establishment that the corps ideally entered the Great Patriotic War.

In 1940, the new mechanised corps organisation was accepted without any experimental verification.  The means of communication, allocated to these corps, were the same as for the 1939 corps, i.e. the 71 TK tank radio and the 5AK automobile station.  With such radio equipment, it turned out that the corps commander could not cope even with the control of the earlier organisation having only 560 tanks.  Even so, despite even more complex conditions, the commanders preferred the new corps, in which the quantity of tanks had practically doubled.

In February 1941, the government approved the new measures to be taken to strengthen the Red Army.  Apart from the nine mechanised corps already in existence, it planned to form a further 21 corps during the course of 1941.  For their formation, all tank units, including the tank battalions in the rifle divisions, were to be used.  Tanks were to be retained only by cavalry divisions (each having a tank regiment with 64 BTs) and by air-landing corps (each having a tank battalion with 50 T-38 and T-40 tanks).

Nevertheless, by the outbreak of war (June 22, 1941), the majority of mechanised corps had not yet been completed; some had no tanks at all, and a few lacked tank crews.  At the beginning of the war, there were 29 activated mechanised corps, 31 motorised and 61 tank divisions. But virtually no combat-ready tank forces in all of Russia. For this they paid a dear price.

  Stay tuned for Part 4 soon!!!