Section Leaders:
Fionn Kelly & Madmatt

Soviet Tank Development (part 2)
by: Fionn Kelly

1933 - 1937

         It was decided to create further mechanised brigades. The 2nd, for the Ukrainian Military District, the 3rd, 4th and 5th for the Belorussian district, and the 6th for the Separate Red-Banner Far-Eastern Army under the command of Marshal Blukher.

         The formation of mechanised troops continued also during 1933.  By January 1, 1934, there were two mechanised corps, six mechanised brigades, six tank regiments, 23 tankette battalions and 37 separate companies for rifle divisions, and 14 mechanised regiments and five mechanised divisions for cavalry.  The completion of these tank formations and units, however, remained at a low level and reached only 47 percent of the required establishment.

         In 1933 a plan was compiled for the development of the RKKA under the Second Five-Year Plan, envisaging a considerable growth in the armoured tank troops.  By January 1, 1938 it was planned to have 25 mechanised and tank brigades (including those in mechanised corps).  Tank regiments were to be reformed into tank brigades. In a Council for Labour and Defence resolution dated August 13, 1933, it was stated that, "under the Second FiveYear Plan, it is necessary to reach such a level of Army mechanisation that will allow the mechanised troops to become one of the basic, decisive elements in combat operations".  This resolution entailed a new system of tank application.

         In 1934 a further two mechanical corps were created.  In the Leningrad Military District the 7th Mechanised Corps was formed.  The lst Mechanised Brigade in the Moscow Military District was transformed into the 5th Mechanised Corps incorporating the earlier K.B. Kalinovsky Brigade.

         Experiments, carried out with mechanised corps, showed them to be cumbersome and to have low mobility.  Due to poor means of communication, particularly with respect to radio equipment, corps commanders could not cope with the control of subordinate units.  The corps were slow-moving during the advance march and when conducting breaks-through.  This was due to the poor reliability of certain tank components, to the poor technical ability of personnel comprising a significant proportion of the tanks, and also to the poor state of the roads.  After 1935 the formation of new corps was stopped.

  In the combined-arms battle tanks were to begin their assigned role as the spearhead force.  The tactics of tank troops in the various phases of battle were as follows:

On the Offence:

          Tanks were used in mass for the breakthrough, in co-operation with aviation, infantry and artillery, pursuing their aims by operations and battles at a high tempo. Based on the tactical-technical characteristics of the T-26 light tank it was considered that, for the simultaneous overpowering of the enemy, it was necessary to have one tank per infantry machine-gun and two to three per anti-tank gun. 

         Consequently, in order to destroy the enemy on the frontal perimeter, it was necessary for each kilometer of front to have 15-16 NPP (Direct Infantry-Support) tanks; and eight or nine light tanks from the DPP (Distant (Remote) Infantry Support Group), which would operate in the depth of the defences.  For successfully combating the enemy artillery one company of medium tanks would be allocated to each battery of enemy artillery expected to be found in their rear areas.  Thus, in order to crush the average divisional artillery complement in 1941, it was necessary to have six companies or two battalions of medium tanks (T-28), comprising the DD (Distant Action Group), backed up by one artillery division (all 12 batteries).

         Thus, using a rifle division supported by tanks to break through the defensive zone of an enemy infantry division on an 8 km front, simultaneously occupying his entire depth as Soviet doctrine demanded, necessitated the use of 180 NPP tanks (i.e. 3-4 light tank battalions), one to two DPP tank battalions, and two battalions of medium DD tanks to fulfill the doctrinal requirements.  Quite an investment of tanks for a divisional assault I am sure you will agree.

Tank groups for the direct support of infantry

(cavalry) in the offence. (NPP)

      These tank groups roamed ahead of the infantry and led the way. They had the co-operational and instructional task of providing a path for the attacking infantry (or cavalry) to the entire depth of the offensive, acting in close co-operation with them.  The tanks cleared a passage through barbed-wire obstacles, destroyed enemy machineguns and active forces as well as his anti-tank means, at the same time repelling counter-attacks. 

Attacking in combat lines with intervals of 25-30 metres between tanks, they "hugged" the artillery fire barrage.  The infantry moved with the tanks in lines, not falling behind by more than 100 m. On meeting obstacles or rather difficult sectors, rifle sub-units would move forward and put in an attack, under the covering fire of the tanks.  The engineers assisted in the provision of passages through minefields and such other enemy-prepared obstructions as might be chanced upon. Overcoming the obstacles, tanks once more advanced and notified the artillery and infantry of their position and axis of advance.

Tank groups for the distant (remote) support of

infantry (cavalry) in the offence. (DPP)

  These were intended for suppressing the enemy's firepower means and active forces in the immediate tactical depth of the defences (that portion of the defences close to the front line), and operated in co-operation with the infantry and the NPP tanks to a depth of 2-4 km.  Concurrently with the attack by the DPP tanks (H-hour) they would break through into the depth of the defences and begin the destruction of appointed objectives with such precision as to render impossible any enemy support to these key objectives in time to prevent their falling.  This, it was believed, would enable a fast rate of advance.

Tanks for distant action (DD)

 These were intended primarily for the destruction of divisional and corps artillery as well as divisional headquarters and the immediate operative reserves committed to the counter-attack. DD tanks were supposed to independently break through the frontal defensive perimeter about 20-30 minutes before H-hour.  They were then to arrive in their appointed target area with such precision as to be able to begin a combined attack against enemy artillery units and other important objectives, thereby distracting them from their assigned tasks and hopefully destroying them.  Simultaneously with the minute-perfect appearance of the DD tanks, some three to six artillery batteries would engage the enemy strategic units. The value of this doctrine in combat is HIGHLY questionable due to the reliance on pinpoint timing, which is, of course, impossible to create in any hard-fought battle.

It is noteworthy that the Soviets maintained a variation of the DD group in their heavy recon groups up until the 1960s. These units contained tanks which were tasked to recon enemy rear echelon positions and attack previously identified headquarters, ammunition dumps and such mobile nuclear weapons launchers as they happened to come across.

            Aircraft cooperating with the DD groups would reveal any anti-tank defences which might hamper their advance, artillery batteries and other enemy strategic objectives which they might choose to attack, and, carry out specific tasks such as informing the tank commanders of the most advantageous directions from which to attack. Immediately prior to the attack, the aircraft would execute bombing and strafing missions against the enemy points of resistance to soften them up prior to the arrival of the DD tank group.

Summation of offensive doctrine. 

            Thus it was considered that, during the "battle in depth", DD, DPP and NPP tank groups could carry out most important roles.  It is important to note that it was believed that successful penetration of the defences at a high rate of speed (2.5 to 3 kilometres per hour) could only be achieved if tanks were used at a density of 75 to 100 tanks per kilometre of ground along the main axis of advance.  It was considered that, given these conditions, six or seven hours would be sufficient in order to break through the enemy's tactical defensive zone and open the gates to the depth.

            The principles of battles and operations in depth were persistently introduced into practical combat training.  Of great significance in this respect were the large-scale military manoeuvres carried out over the period 1935-36 in the Moscow, Belorussian, and Kiev Military Districts.

            Whilst these Soviet views on the conduct of the mechanised offensive were reasonably sound for the era, the tremendous emphasis they placed on precision and co-ordination, and the sheer number of the units involved (often corps level) required a very high level of technological communications which did not exist at that time.  Additionally, they required a level of training and tactical co-ordination which the Soviet forces prior to the 1938 purges found difficult to deliver, and the anaemic, terrorised, unimaginative survivors of that time of terror were completely unwilling and unable to attain.

In meeting engagements or encounter battles 

  Quite correctly, the Soviets determined that the mobile character of future wars inferred large encounter battles and meeting engagements which, by their very nature, entailed the fullest use of tank troops possessing mobility, firepower and thrusting force. 

In the instructional literature of those years, it was emphasised that encounter battles would be characterized by fierce struggles to gain the initiative and striving to impose one's will upon the enemy.  It would be destroying him through the seizure of advantageous objectives, by opening fire and developing decisive thrusts on the enemy’s flanks and rear before he could deploy, or by pursuing him to the ultimate defeat. 

The obscurity of the conditions accompanying this type of battle necessitated that commanders at all levels should make well-timed, bold and intelligent decisions regarding the destruction of even small enemy forces.  It was recommended that the order of march be organised in such a way that it represented implicitly the future form of battle order since there would often be relatively little time to "shake out" from the march order into combat order.

Of course as I must constantly note, the Soviets were woefully inadequate in their ability to transform their understanding of the tactical and operational concepts involved into sound training and utilisation of the forces at hand.

In the defensive

The contemporary Soviet defence was based upon a system of anti-infantry and anti-tank fire combined with the use of the most advantageous terrain, heavily fortified buildings and obstacles and upon counter-attacks and counter-thrusts by the second echelon with the aim of routing or wedging-in the enemy.

The main objective was to bring about his defeat in front of the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area … a term which came into common usage in NATO circles post-WW2).  To achieve this, no less than two-thirds of the firepower was to be made available for the creation of an "impenetrable fire zone", some 400-600metres in depth. 

However, the use of massed tanks in the offensive also necessitated their massed use in the defensive.  Thus, should the enemy break through in depth, he could be worn down by passage through numerous, dense, organised and mutually supporting defensive belts before the exhausted survivors would be counter-attacked by fresh Soviet reserves brought up during the defensive phases of the battle. The execution of defensive tasks involved the defeat of enemy tanks and their supporting infantry so long as a serious threat existed.

A re-reading of the Kursk battle, in particular of the Soviet defensive measures is a very rewarding experience once this pre-second world war Soviet doctrine is fully remembered. I would be glad to discuss the similarities on the message board or email forum should anyone be so interested. I recommend it since it would be an enlightening and rewarding experience as well as almost certainly one which would show new features once these early concepts and doctrine are remembered.

            Tank sub-units comprising the manoeuvre reserve of the combined-arms commander would frequently be used in combination with second-echelon units for the liquidation of the wedged-in enemy and thereby the restoration of the defence. One of the key concepts in this method, which is often forgotten, is that the Soviet commander was responsible for his OWN line and could not rely on outside forces to come to his aid in the sealing off of local penetrations.

If a commander could not seal off the enemy breakthrough then higher-echelon commanders would commit forces AND the new force commander would take over control of that region of the front. Between natural human reluctance to cede control to others and sound military reasoning, Soviet commanders fought HARD to maintain control over their own fate, even at the expense of huge losses to their subordinate units. This is another point which should be borne in mind when examining large campaigns and questioning why reserves were not committed at such and such a time, or were not requested by the front-line commanders whose forces were being immolated.

  Stay tuned for Part 3 soon!!!