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Section Leaders:
Soviet
Tank Development (part 1)
Part 1 Unstable Foundations
According to Soviet sources, the earliest official record
pertaining to the formation of Soviet armoured units is dated November
1917. It was then that the
Provisional Armoured Board was established under the direction of G.V.
Elinim. The first task
assigned to this board was the convocation of the 2nd All-Russian
Armoured Car Conference for the purpose of creating armoured units for
the armed forces of the new Soviet state.
After thorough examination by the delegates at the conference, a
scheme was approved stating that, "The direction of all armoured
units in the Soviet Russian Republic shall be entrusted to the Armoured
Units Council subordinated to the Executive Committee selected at the
2nd All-Russian Armoured Car Conference."
The Armoured Units Council was made organic to the central
command apparatus of the Red Army.
It remained the basic organ for the direction of armoured units
until the end of August 1918, at which time it was transformed into the
Armoured Directorate and made subordinate to the head of the Main
Military-Engineering Directorate.
The origin of the formation of Soviet tank units dates back to
1919. At this time, the
Armoured Directorate, responding to orders from the RVSR (Revolutionary
Military Council), began to put into practice measures for the creation
of Soviet tank units. For
the first tank units, referred to at that time as Auto-Tank
Detachments, use was made of captured tanks taken by the Red Army from
the White Armies and the internationalist forces.
By the end of 1919, the Soviet Army was equipped with three
types of captured tanks. They
were referred to as 'bolishie' (large), 'srednie' (medium) and 'malie'
(small). One tank of each
type was made organic to each auto-tank detachment.
The establishment tables for the auto-tank detachment were
endorsed by the RVSR on May 28, 1920.
Shortly afterwards, a special infantry detachment totalling 20
soldiers was introduced into the unit's establishment.
These detachments were intended for the protection of the tanks
in battle. Later, on the
basis of an analysis of the initial combat experiences with tanks, the
need was recognised for the formation of twin-platoon auto-tank
detachments having two vehicles of the same type in each platoon.
It was necessary to have twin-platoon auto-tank detachments
since this organization gave much-increased tactical flexibility to the
commander. It was
desirable to equip each two-tank platoon with the same tank type since
this eased the maintenance problems, AND ensured that both tanks in a
platoon would have the same operational speed, firepower and
protection. Clearly, it
would be far preferable to have two slow, heavily armoured and armed
tanks in one platoon where they could support each other, than to have
one small, lightly armed and armoured tank paired with a heavy and slow
tank. This negates the
speed advantage of the small tank and greatly limits the usefulness of
the heavy tank's armour since, while it might not be endangered by a
certain enemy unit, its companion tank would be.
In short, mixing tanks within the platoon gave very few, if any,
advantages and many, many disadvantages.
By September 1920, there were 11 auto-tank detachments in the
Red Army.
Subsequently, the manufacture of the first Soviet KS light tanks
enabled native vehicles to be adopted by the Soviet Army.
The tactical-technical characteristics of these first tanks
allowed only the direct support and accompaniment of the infantry
during the break-through of enemy defences.
This was due to their inadequacy for the job of following up
after the initial breakthrough.
The personnel of the first Soviet armoured units were recruited
from numerous volunteers who had previously served in the armoured car
divisions and armoured trains of the old Tsarist Army.
This allowed the selection of the best, the most conscientious,
and the most technically competent combat-experienced personnel. The training of tankers was carried out in the Separate
Reserve Division for the Formation of Auto-Tank Detachments. The systematic training of command cadres for the armoured
force began in April 1918 with the establishment of intensified
armoured courses, on the basis of which, at the beginning of 1919, the
Armoured School was formed, representing the first combat training organization
for the armoured force of the Red Army.
Once more, in the autumn of 1919, the Higher Military-Automobile
School was created, intended for the preparation of military engineers
for the armoured force and commanders for taking over the role of
leading armoured detachments, armoured trains and auto-tank
detachments. At the same
time, the school represented the most important military science centre
of that era for analysing the experience of the war and drawing, on a
military science basis, conclusions over the use of armoured forces in
future war. At the end of
1919, the Armoured School and the Higher Military-Automobile School
were amalgamated into one educational establishment, the Higher
Military-Automobile-Armoured School of the Red Army. (They LOVED long
names didn't they ? ;-) .)
As early as January 1919, the First Instructions on the Combat
Utilisation of Armoured Cars and Armoured Trains were brought into
being, and in September 1920, the Instructions for the Combat
Utilisation of Tanks were published.
These represented the very first Soviet tank regulations.
Broadly, the instructions determined that the armoured forces at
that time represented a subsidiary means of combat, their basic role
being to carry out thrusts into the enemy suddenly, in combination with
rifle troops and horsed-cavalry.
The armoured forces of the Red Army were used with some success
on the fronts during the Civil War, and various kinds of combat actions
were carried out by these troops.
Together with extensions to the roles of armoured units during
battles and operations, and increases in their numbers, improvements
took place also in the organisational structure of the central command
organisations of the armoured forces.
In the spring of 1920, the "Office of Inspector of Armoured
Units" was created for the Field Staff of the RVSR, and the
"Office of Chief of Armoured Units" for the fronts and
armies, accordingly. These
offices were made responsible for controlling the state and fighting
efficiency of the armoured force, combat leadership training, and for
ensuring the correct deployment of armoured units during battles and
operations. As before, the
Armoured Directorate retained responsibility for forming new units, for
material-technical provision to operational troops, and the combat
training of rear armoured units.
The availability of these two command organisations for the
armoured forces resulted inevitably in certain overlaps in their
functions. With the aim of
removing such deficiencies, the 'Independent Directorate of the Chief
of the Armoured Forces of the Red Army', was set up by an RVSR
Directive dated May 6, 1921. This
new unit was subordinated directly to the 'Chief of Staff of the Red
Army' and, with regards to provisions, to the 'Commander-in Chief of
Supplies'. This form of
central organisation for directing the armoured forces represented the
most expedient that could be developed at that time.
The period of intense mechanisation and motorisation, as well as
the overall expansion of the Red Army, which started during the
mid-1920s and continued through to the late 1930s, is one that I don't
have time or space to cover fully here.
I would have to write an entire book to cover it fully.
I can however correspond with anyone concerning this era via the
email forums and message board, and answer any questions that I can.
(or any other contributor to the forum can)
A whole spectrum of important and interesting aspects of this
time period, such as the establishment and development of special
schools and research centres, factories, training centres must be
either dealt with superficially or ignored completely. This includes
the influence of foreign assistance, such as the Germans at Kazan and
Voronezh, and the Americans in the huge automobile and metallurgy
centres, etc.
This is unfortunate since these aspects were, in some respects,
crucial to the Soviet war effort during the "Great Patriotic
War". Fortunately, I
will be able to briefly cover them in other articles I am writing about
the economic nature of the Second World War, with a special focus on
the raw resources and productive capacity of the European combatants
and America. These
articles will appear at a later date, once I have finished typing and
posting my weapons and tactics articles.
In 1924-1925, during the period of military reform, the
organisational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces was established in
accordance with available armaments and combat means.
All the principles of military doctrine were reflected in the
Provisional Field Service Regulations of the Red Army, 1925, and in the
Provisional Combat Regulations for the Armoured Forces of the Red Army,
1925. It was in these volumes, on the basis of experience gained during
the First World and Civil wars, and the Military Intervention, was
stated the theory for the combat use of tanks.
The application of the, "Five-Year Plan for the Development
of the Armed Forces" was started by the General Staff of the Red
Army in 1927, under the direct leadership of M. N. Tukhachevsky, who
was, at that time, CIGS RKKA. Basically,
the plan was formulated on the following conclusions:
'The decisive means for future armed-conflicts appear to be: a)
rifle troops together with powerful artillery; b)
strategic horse-cavalry; c)
aviation.'
In general, tanks were not referred to here; this was not
unintentional. Soviet
industry had barely begun the production of the first native tank
(MS-1). The total armoured
strength in 1927 amounted to one tank regiment and six auto-armoured
divisions, excluding the armoured trains.
Their establishment included several tanks of foreign design,
which were proving difficult to integrate into the replacement and
maintenance regimes of the units being formed.
The final draft for the, "First Five-Year Plan for the
Development and Reconstruction of the Armed Forces of the USSR",
was sanctioned by the Soviet Government on July 30, 1928.
It was scheduled for the period 1928-1932.
At the end of this Five-Year Plan, it was intended to have 1,075
tanks, and to have formed three new tank regiments and several separate
battalions.
In 1928, in connection with the increased progress in the
development of native armoured technology, the forces developed the
Provisional Instructions for the Combat Use of Tanks, in which were
detailed clearly the principles for their utilization.
At that time it was considered that their combat operations
should be carried out purely in the interests and support of the
infantry. In the offensive, two levels of infantry co-operation were
permitted: a)
tanks for their direct support, or b)
tanks in advanced echelon.
In the first case, the tanks played no independent roles and
directly assisted the infantry, operating organically.
Each rifle battalion was allotted one to three tank platoons
depending on the circumstances. In
the second case they operated only in tactical liaison with the
infantry (i.e. just outside of their field of fire and vision (this is
a rough definition only)), independently overwhelming or destroying
artillery, local reserves, command points, centres of resistance and
other important objectives. The
forward echelons (free-maneouvre groups), comprising each one to two
tank companies, were created in rifle regiments of the first echelon.
For the development of success in depth of the enemy defences,
and to replace tank sub-units which had lost their combat
effectiveness, reserve echelons were made available to the divisional
commander. In the defence,
tanks were intended for counterattacks and counter-thrusts, wedging in
the enemy defensive positions. Rifle
units were ceaselessly instructed in co-operating with tanks. As can be
seen the tank was seen as an offensive weapon which, even in the
defence, could only be used in an offensive manner, i.e. the
counter-attack.
During 1929, in connection with the progress in the rebuilding
of the economy and the accelerated tempo of the industrialization of
the country, the Communist Party gave the RVSR the task of supervising
the "First Five-Year Plan".
This plan was charged with providing the tools with which to
protect the ideology of the communist Soviet Union.
The Socialist Dialectic was all-important. It not only had to be
defended, but, if the military was sufficiently strong, promulgated and
exported to nearby countries, using force if necessary.
Thus, one of the tenets of the first plan was to create a Red
Army which was more powerful than any potential enemy in three decisive
forms of armaments, these being: the
air force artillery
tanks
These orders were issued on July 15, 1929.
Somewhat earlier, on May 6, the Government endorsed a new
schedule for the delivery of tanks during the period of the First
Five-Year Plan. Altogether,
over this period, the Red Army was to receive 3,500 tanks, three times
as many as planned in 1928. This is evidence of the serious
reconsideration of tank actions and utility at this time in the Soviet
Union.
On the basis of the orders it had received, the RVSR approved
the formation of the following armoured tank units by the end of the
Five-Year Plan:
a)
three mechanised brigades, b)
30 mixed tank battalions, each with 32 light (T-26) & 34
medium (T-28) tanks, c)
four heavy tank battalions in the RGK, each having 35 tanks, and
d)
13 mechanised regiments for the cavalry, each made up of tank
and armoured
divisions.
The General Staff of the RKKA demanded the verification, through
trial studies, of the most expedient establishment for a tank
battalion: primarily, whether it should be mixed or homogeneous. By
mixed and homogenous I mean, should a tank battalion contain,
organically, infantry, engineers, artillery etc OR should a tank
battalion contain ONLY tanks. Tanks were not to be included in rifle
formations.
Apparently, the RVSR proposed the creation of major tank units
in the RGK, intended for augmenting the thrusting power of the rifle
formations. Again, since
horsed-cavalry at that time was considered to be a decisive means of
developing the breakthrough, it was decided that tanks should enter the
establishment of the cavalry formations. One of the reasons for such a
questionable decision was that a large number of cavalry officers had
attained positions of influence and did not want to see their precious
cavalry arm "run down" in favour of another branch of the Red
Army.
Simultaneously with the determination of the organisational
structure of armoured-tank units, on July 17, 1929, the RVSR approved
the tactical-technical requirements for armoured equipment.
During 1929 and the first half of 1930, industry began the
serial delivery of the MS-1 tank. By the end of 1931, the Army had
received nearly 900 of these combat vehicles.
Rapid development of the tactics of the tank troops took place
during the 1930s. The
accelerated industrialisation of the country permitted the re-equipping
of the Army with new tanks and armaments in mass.
The impetus to tank production began during the second half of
1931, and proceeded particularly successfully during 1932 and
subsequent years.
During 1931 the delivery of MS-1 tanks was terminated and
production started on the T-26 machine-gun tank and the T-27 tankette.
In 1932, the BT-2 tank was adopted, and in 1933 the T-35, T-28,
BT-5, T-26 gun-tank in place of the original machine-gun model, and the
T-37 amphibious tankette were turned out.
From 1932 onwards, the Red Army received more than 3,000 tanks
and tankettes yearly.
In accordance with the RVSR decision, in 1930, new armoured-tank
units and formations began to be formed.
On the basis of the small, mechanised regiment deployed in the
Moscow Military District, the First Experimental-Organisation
Mechanised Brigade was created. Placed
under the command of K.B. Kalinovsky, it became known as 'Brigade
Kalinovsky'. Initially it
comprised one MS-1 tank regiment, a motorised infantry regiment, an
artillery division and a reconnaissance battalion.
The brigade had 60 tanks, 32 tankettes, 17 armoured cars, 264
automobiles and 12 tractors.
In 1931 it was intensified, and now comprised: 1.
A Reconnaissance Group- a
regiment, incorporating a tankette battalion, an auto-armoured
division, an auto-machine-gun battalion, and an artillery division, 2.
A Thrust Group- a
regiment comprising two tank battalions and two self-propelled
artillery divisions. For
experiments, the self-propelled guns were represented by tractors
mounting 76mm field guns, 3.
A battalion of transported infantry, 4.
Artillery groups comprising three divisions (with 76 mm guns and
122 mm howitzers) and an anti-aircraft division.
Altogether, the composition of the brigade was placed at 4,700
men, 119 tanks, 100 tankettes, 15 armoured cars, 63 self-propelled
anti-aircraft mountings (machine-gun), 32 self-propelled 76mm guns, 16
122mm howitzers, 12 76mm anti-aircraft guns, 32 37mm anti-aircraft
guns, 270 motor-cars and lorries, and 100 tractors.
In peacetime the 'separate tank battalions of the RGK' were
deployed as regiments (each with three tank battalions).
By mid-1932 four regiments had been formed: ·
the
lst in Smolensk, ·
the
2nd in Leningrad, ·
the
4th in Kharkov. ·
while
the 3rd Tank Regiment was
already in existence in the Moscow Military District as a tank-cadre.
Separate tank battalions were established as territorial units,
mainly in industrial regions. By
1932 there were three territorial tank battalions. Tank units in the
horsed-cavalry developed gradually.
Initially, three mechanised squadrons and divisions were
established. These were to
be followed later by regiments. By 1932, in the formations there were two mechanised
regiments, two divisions and three squadrons.
The rapid developments in aviation and artillery also allowed
the possibility of combat inter-cooperation between all arms
simultaneously. In this
way Soviet military thought developed the ideas of battles and
operations in depth expounded earlier by Fuller and Liddel Hart.
It was decided that 'the main and fundamental aim of the
military art - (is) to forbid the formation of a solid front, to
encourage operations and battles which deal a crushing blow and allow a
rapid tempo' (Marshal A. 1. Egorov).
It was considered that the most effective solution was to
facilitate a thrust by enormous strike forces to the entire depth of
the combat and operative structure of the enemy.
And for this it would be necessary to deeply echelon
inter-cooperative masses of rifle troops, tanks and artillery,
supported by aircraft.
During 1931, and at the beginning of 1932, lively debates took
place in the Narkomate for Defence over the extent and direction of the
further expansion of the Soviet Armed Forces, and on their technical
requirements. It was recognized
that the composition of the Army, which could be deployed in the event
of war, would not conform to the tasks that might confront it.
Furthermore, the complex theories of deep penetrations and
battles necessitated new methods of approach to the building-up of the
Army, in particular, to the mobile troops.
In a series of works and papers, originated by M.N. Tukhachevsky
and others, a case was argued for the creation then, in peacetime, of
large-scale armoured tank formations with which, in case of war, one
could create alongside cavalry formations "horsed-cavalry-mechanised-armies
(groups)" for developing successes during front operations.
At the beginning of August 1931, the government endorsed a plan
for the build-up of the RKKA over the period 1931-1933.
Simultaneously, on August 1, 1931, the Council for Labour and
Defence accepted the so-called "Great Tank Programme".
This arose from the fact that "technical achievements in
the field of tank construction in the USSR create a sound basis for
radical alterations to the universal operative-tactical doctrines in
the employment of tanks and necessitate decisive organizational changes
to the armoured-tank troops in respect of the creation of superior
mechanised formations, capable as much of solving tasks on the
battlefield as also in the entire operative depth of a modern combat
front. The new high-mobility material of the units provide the basis
for elaborating the theories of battles and operations in depth"
(M. N. Tukhachevsky). In
order to determine the organization for armoured-tank troops, a special
commission was established which, during a conference held on March 9
1932, recommended that the Soviet Army should possess the following:
The RVS, on March 11, 1932, considered the question of the
organisation of the armoured-tank troops, and decided to form, two
mechanised corps for which one rifle division each from the Leningrad
and Ukraine Military Districts were selected.
During Autumn 1932, on the basis of the 11th Rifle Division in
the Leningrad Military District, the l1th Mechanised Corps was formed,
and, correspondingly, in the Ukraine Military District, on the basis of
the 45th Rifle Division, the 45th Mechanised Corps.
In the establishment of the mechanised corps was a mechanised
brigade with T-26 tanks (three tank battalions, a rifle-machine-gun
battalion, an artillery division, an engineer battalion, an
antiaircraft machine-gun company), a second tank brigade of identical
composition but equipped with BT tanks, a rifle brigade, and corps
units consisting of reconnaissance, engineers, flame-throwing
battalions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a traffic-control
company, a technical supply base and an aviation detachment. Quite an
assembly of specialist units I'm sure you'll agree.
During the same year, in accordance with the plan, five separate
mechanised brigades, two tank regiments, 12 mechanised regiments, four
mechanised divisions for horsed-cavalry, 15 tank and 65 tankette
battalions for rifle divisions began to be formed.
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