Section Leaders:
  Fionn Kelly & Madmatt 

Learning to Defend: My Experience

By Adam "Pillar" Lloyd

Adam_S_Lloyd@Yahoo.Com

Introduction

This is an account of what and how I've learned about conducting a defense. While what is written here is not limited to Combat Mission, the simulator has been central in my putting these theories into practical experience. It has shown me without apology what will work, and what will not.

I have chosen not to use the standard "AAR" format. The reason is simple: I want to isolate the conceptual framework. The concepts are what you use as a guide when setting up your defense in the CM battlefield. When you read AAR's, you don't always get an explicitly defined conceptual framework, but more an analysis of terrain specific to the map in question. You also leave room for confusion and don't cover "What If" scenarios that didn't come up during the match itself. Finally, you restrict your doctrine to a medium, rather than let if flow as an idea. CM is a great tool for testing doctrine, but I favor this type of presentation for developing it.

This is not a guide to the basics of combat. Issues such as "achieving hull-down", using over watch, using terrain cover, etc are not covered. It is assumed that these practices will be implemented when conducting any doctrine. This guide is for those who know the basics and wish to go beyond the micro-level decisions, as I did.

Beginners will get an idea of how to go about learning for themselves. I have included an appendix packed with links to information I find vital to learning about warfare. Intermediate players will find plenty to experiment with and adapt for themselves. More advanced players will (I hope) be inclined to discuss this document with me.

I make no claim to originality. Much of what I have learned and incorporated has been influenced by the thoughts and discoveries of others. Soviet Doctrine, introduced to me by Fionn Kelly, has had the greatest impact on my deployment and conduct. American Field Manuals have had profound influence on the way I handle units and the way I analyze terrain. Many articles written by an equally many people have also given rise to adaptations in my doctrine. My success has been indebted to these sources.

I am still a student.





Growing Pains

CM has opened me up to a world of tactical and strategic thought I probably would never have known existed otherwise. From the beginning of my experiences with the simulation, I knew there would be plenty of depth to the play and many of interesting people to meet along the way.

My first concept of a defense was simple: Place your forces on defensible terrain, wait for the enemy to approach and ambush his first echelon. The defense was linear and without any significant depth. Reserves were something I used casually, and I had no doctrine on how they should be employed. This is a defense I see from many newer students (and I consider most CM players students, for this is more than just any old game).

This defense will succeed however (though not exceedingly well) against players who attack on a broad front. Don't confuse this with broad front recon. Broad front attacks are almost never a good idea. I still see players these days attacking this way, usually infantry aren't supporting one another, support weapons are left vulnerable, and tanks distributed in a manner unsupportive of one another. This type of game: shallow, static, linear defense vs. a broad front attack, is typical of beginner games. The winner is usually the one who gets lucky with their armor and has superior micro-decision making ability.

Then we meet the narrow front attacker.

If an attack comes as a focused, concentrated assault on the weaker areas of your defense, it is probably going to penetrate your line. At this point, the attacker can reorient and outflank your forces, proceeding then to "roll up" your flanks and hence destroy your defenses piece meal. Most players I have met who are considered "good" use this type of attack, however, they lack a crucial element: recon. While a concentrated attack can succeed against a weak point in the enemy defense, it will still fail to penetrate even a linear defensive strongpoint. Without recon, one can only rely on luck and 'intuition' to attack a favorable approach. The most detailed terrain analysis is not a substitute for knowledge of the enemy.

When an enemy attacks with his main body along a narrow axis of approach, AND they conduct a reconnaissance to determine the best point of attack, you meet a very difficult situation as a defender.






Lessons Learned

I began investigating ways to overcome this attack; while simultaneously I thought of ways the attacker could improve their own chances of success. It was at this point that I began to talk with Fionn Kelly, who I contacted after reading a series of After Action Reports posted on the CombatHQ. Fionn introduced me to the Soviet doctrine of warfare. Fionn has influenced me immensely, and if any would wonder if I ever had a teacher, it is he that deserves that title.

The first principle of beating the concentrated attack was simple: Identify where it is coming from. The Soviets place great importance on scouting and recon. On the defense, this means having a security/recon element (SRE) forward of the defensive positions. The effect is threefold:
A) You gain great information on where the attack is coming from before it is too late to react effectively.
B) You have opportunities to ambush enemy forces and fall back before he can react, without risk of critical breaches in your defense.
C) If the enemy is smart enough to use recon, you can deny him that information or force him to commit support assets to his reconnaissance (leaving less for his main body)

By identifying the enemy early, we can begin long-range attrition through artillery and other long-range DF assets. This will certainly kill some of his forces, but more importantly it will slow him and cause chaos in his march. This means he is forced to: 

A) Regroup for a better coordinated attack, which takes time
B) Attack you as is, with less coordination

Meanwhile, the defensive commander now has opportunity to shift reserves into defensive positions where the enemy is going to attack. In sum, with as little as a platoon out front in SRE role, one can significantly improve his chances for victory.

With this naturally come three levels of a defensive belt: The SRE, the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) and the Reserves or Second Echelon (SLR). This is the very basic of what is called a tactical defense in depth. Defending in depth simply means that your forces don't act on a single line.

This seemingly simple yet effective approach fascinated me. I began putting my hands on as many resources as I possibly could illustrating real world military doctrine, primarily that of the Soviet Union. The primary sources for this information are unfortunately hard to come by, but the US Army has plenty of online information through the foreign military studies site. There are also books available for those interested. I also read many of the US Field Manuals available through TRADOC. I highly recommend the resources the US Army has worked to make available for the public. See my references section for more.

After the function and feel of these basics became more familiar to me, I began to work on ways of making each work to its full capacity. It became harder at this point to find more information, usually I would scratch upon a sentence or two in an article that would lead me to further elaborate. The SRE became to me much more active and aggressive, often catching enemy support weaponry on its way up and then buggering out before the enemy could react. The main line of resistance grew more elaborate. I learned to create intense killing zones and fire sacks with great portions of firepower being coordinated on the enemy attack. I also found value in coordinated withdrawals from action from the MLR, only to have the enemy drawn back into a secondary line of resistance (SLR) just as lethal as the first. Finally, I began apply the concept of reserves to virtually every level on the battlefield. I found that my forces could react far quicker than I had ever dreamed using local reserves as well as main battlefield reserves. 

I'll elaborate on these principles, and explain my current beliefs below.

Picture: Soviet Battalion on the Defense
Click to enlarge

The SRE: "Guerilla Warfare" in the Front Lines

I currently have a few objectives for my security/recon element:

1) Identify the Enemy and Interpret his Intentions
2) Deny the Enemy Recon
3) Kill, Disrupt, and Funnel the advancing attacker

Purposes:

1) Allow for shifting of the Defense for Expected Attack
2) Prevent Enemy from determining optimum avenues of attack
3) A: Slow the enemy to buy time for reserves
B: Disrupt the enemy formation and to un-coordinate the attack
C: Destroy crucial portions of the enemy force

Methodology:

If you have studied Guerilla attacks, you'll know how I like to operate an SRE. While this is not Guerilla warfare as such, I thought it was a good analogy for most players: Fast strokes against enemy weakness and hasty withdraw, coupled with ambush. I use my most experienced troops in this role. If I can get Elite's, I do. 

I make no claims to this type of fighting being "fair" or "honorable", it's just plain nasty. While some players feel frustration upon meeting an attacking body when they are supposed to be the "attacker", I don't find anything unrealistic about it. Those who expect things to go by "the rules" and get frustrated at unexpected enemy behavior are bound to loose the fight, both in the CM arena and in real life. 

Deployment is divided into three phases. First a rearmost set of foxholes is established. This is to serve as the final ambush point before a retreat to the MLR in the event of enemy overrun in that sector. Next is a forward set of foxholes, which serves as a secondary ambush/fighting position. Finally, non-fortified ambush positions are established even further ahead of these two-phase lines. 

My next decision comes during the initial stages of the conflict. I must decide whether I wish this SRE section to go active or remain hidden. This decision will be influenced heavily by whether or not I see the enemy, as well as what my terrain offers. 

If I do not see the enemy, or think I will be able to move forward with little risk, I will. I will actively hunt for strays of the enemy formation and cut them down. Many a time I have obliterated the support weapons from an enemy attack before the attack had even materialized on my fronts. Similar actions can be studied in Fionn Kelly's "Sunken Lane" AAR, in which his entire formation was conducted using this logic (an impressive feat). If the enemy fails to protect his flanks, support mutually all his forces, and keep things neat and tidy, these men will make him pay for it.

If I do see a great enemy force approaching in the sector of this particular SRE, I will usually decide to leave them be in their forward ambush. This is because moving them at this point will simply result in their destruction by a superior enemy's frontal echelon. I will hope to be given an opportunity later for them to go active, based on the enemy movement, but for now they will wait and watch. Light arty spotters will be brought into place at their positions and begin to disrupt the enemy formation. Under this circumstance, the SRE serves merely to observe the enemy and protect the spotter. I also will recognize whether an ambush is viable, or whether I should withdraw back to phase line 2 (first foxholes). If I think the enemy will simply plow over my ambush in this sector, they will fall back earlier. This logic continues all the way back to the MLR.

I value the SRE troops highly and will not take senseless risks with them, but I will take risks. If they tell me the enemy attack is vacant in their sector, they become a guerilla counter-attacking force to be reckoned with for the enemy. In a recent game, I encircled an attacking mass and while he worked on my MLR, my elite SRE approached from the rear and annihilated some support weapons. The gain came however, not from those losses, but from causing the enemy to take good portions of his attack and turn it 180 degrees about face to deal with the new threat to his rear. Draw your own conclusions on that.

Notes on Artillery Usage:

It is generally NOT viable to use artillery on anything less than a positively identified enemy Platoon. Don't be too eager to use it. If there aren't targets now, there will be later. Don't fire arty into area's you 'suspect' enemy formations are unless it is confirmed. Artillery is far to precious a resource to be thrown away or used carelessly. I see players using artillery on single squads and/or Machine Guns to my own delight, since I won't have to worry too much about it later on in the battle.

Artillery is a part of the battlefield you must accept. Don't try and focus your efforts on tracking down spotters. You'll soon loose the focus of the fight and the enemy will take advantage of this.

Try at all times to have your spotters close to the action where they have LOS. The end result is about twice the firepower on target, and that's well worth the risk. I haven't lost a spotter practicing this yet, since the level of suppression is usually phenomenal. 

Finally, take advantage of your arty and don't be afraid to use it close to your own men when the situation allows it.


As a side note I've included here an illustration of a Soviet Division in Defense. This will give you a good idea of what the big picture around your experience in Combat Mission consists of. Notice the use of Forward Detachments well ahead of the first echelon as well as an extensive Security Zone of 15km in depth. This is modern doctrine based on modern capabilities (scale wise), but it serves to illustrate the Soviet thinking excellently.

Can you think of a weakness in this defense? How is this different than a US defense?

The Big Picture: A Soviet Division in Defense
Click to enlarge

Hell: The MLR

The Main Line of Resistance is designed to integrate fire support while leaving room for internal fluidity to deal with breaches. While carefully planned, there is less finesse and glory than in the SRE, yet it is absolutely crucial in its performance. The MLR is what it's all about. The SRE can't stop an enemy force (though I've had exceptions), the MLR can. I like the way Russel Crowe from the movie Gladiator put it when he said: "On my word, unleash Hell." That is the way one expects the MLR to work against an oncoming attacker (interestingly in the movie, a forward detachment enveloped and attacked into the rear of the enemy attackers).

Perimeters, Obstacles and Penetrations

Mass is the key to stopping an enemy force. If your forces cannot act as a unit, the enemy can isolate parts of it and obliterate them piece meal. I count on any good player to recognize opportunities for this. A good player will penetrate into a portion of my first echelon of defense. It is absolutely critical that I am able at the very least to make him pay for any penetration, and that favorably I contain or obliterate the penetration. My methods for accomplishing this are twofold:

A) All defensive positions are organized to be capable of perimeter defense. I assume the enemy will manage to isolate each and every single one of my strong points and I prepare for it.
B) I use any free assets in the area to conduct counterattacks against the enemy just as they make it into the penetrated area. The enemy is almost always pinned or unprepared at this moment. In any case, it is crucial that local counter attacks are used to repulse the enemy breaches. If you have fresh reserves close at hand, they are useful in this role.

A useful method of company deployment in a front line is two platoons forward with one in rear. The rear platoon can be used to seal off penetrations and conduct counterattacks. It can also provide covering fire for withdraw of the forward platoons if need be.

I use obstacles extensively for certain purposes. Anti tank minefields are used on expected enemy armor avenues of approach. They are not relied on however to stop the enemy. A common mistake I've encountered is for a commander to think they have 'sealed off' an avenue of enemy armor approach and leave the sector otherwise lightly defended. A simple Engineer squad coupled with good scouting will open that avenue for the attacker to his great pleasure. 

Obstacles do not seal off approaches. Rather, they act as part of the combined arms team and make the enemy penetration even more difficult.


Fire and Lead

The strong points, as I have said, are mutually supportive. My biggest artillery spotters are present at the MLR coupled with plenty of DF fire support weaponry. At every opportunity (provided by terrain) I create fire sacks, which the enemy is likely to fall into. Machine guns cover flanks, passages of maneuver for my own reserves and counterattacks, and areas where I think enemy penetration is likely. 

Anti-Tank assets are massed against routes of suspected enemy armored advance. Depending on the size of the engagement, I may have to place these based on terrain analysis alone. Larger engagements will allow me to bring AT Guns into place via vehicle, based on SRE reports. My own armor operates hidden massed together in defensive positions within the MLR at a smaller scales. On larger scales, I may keep my armor in reserve for mobility and strikes against attacker flanks. Always massed however, regardless. I reference scale because on smaller scales (depending on terrain of course) flanking an enemy armored force does little but expose your own flank as you move. Since the enemy will be superior in number, this isn't a good thing for me. Man portable AT assets are always moved into position based on reports from the SRE. I prefer to organize them en masse as well and create fire sacks for enemy armor. This is based on my experience that any man-portable AT asset will only get a first or second shot kill from close range 1/3 times. There is no such thing as a third or fourth shot kill from a man portable AT asset, unless you get REALLY lucky.

Retreats and Counter Offensives

If the enemy force is overwhelming my defense in any area, I'm happy to withdraw before things go too much to hell and try again further to the rear. The decision to withdraw or whether to stay and fight to the death is made based on terrain. First, my chances of surviving the withdraw to any useful degree, and second, my ability to setup decent defense again further to the rear. The decision to retreat is not taken lightly. If there is any significant chance that I can contain an enemy or kill him, I will attempt to do so. 

I also do not generally conduct a counter offensive at a battalion scale, as it's usually good enough just to hold the key terrain and realistically let the regiment take care of a counter attack. Rarely however, the circumstances will warrant a counter attack if it means preventing further casualties to my force without risking the defense. Such situations can arise for example, from enemy DF fire assets out of range of my defense or indirect assets, which will cause me casualties if I remain still. Again, the decision to counter attack is not a light one. If there is any chance a counter attack will risk my force, it simply won't happen. I'd sooner wait out an arty barrage than run into an enemy deception/ambush. Also note that I refer here to counter offensives in general. My defense may consist of micro-offensive maneuver.

My Free Hand: The Value of Reserves

Reserve employment is the simplest part of the engagement. For most players, there are only two questions: When and Where shall I commit my reserves?

I have an additional question I ask myself: How should the reserve be used? I will explain more on this later.

Classic concept of a reserve

A reserve is simply a portion of your forces designated apart from the first echelon of defense. It is classically thought of as being used to reinforce the sector of expected enemy attack, since the enemy will rarely attack all sectors evenly. It is meant to help equalize the numeric difference at the main effort of enemy attack, and hence help the defender overcome the risk of breakthrough.

When?

The decision of when to employ a reserve is simple yet critical to the battlefield. Commit to early and the enemy may shift on you unexpectedly. Commit too late and the enemy may breakthrough before your reserve arrives, resulting in the destruction of your forces in a meeting engagement. This is why the attacker is always emphasizing speed in his maneuver. He wants to break through with such momentum that you have no time to reestablish a defense.

The SRE is the critical means of determining when to commit. By keeping an eye on the enemy, you can tell (through experience) when it would be too late for him to change directions without taking significant time to do so (allowing your reserve to shift yet again). The SRE also must disseminate from the real enemy main effort and any deceptive moves he might make. Typically, deceptive maneuver is difficult to identify from the MLR due to distances. With the SRE, one can have no doubt.

Where?

At the point of the enemy main effort usually. The only exception being if one sees greater possibility to "deny the flank" of your forces to the enemy rather than reinforce the possibly weak defensive area the enemy is ready to attack. The overall point however, no matter where you commit, is to stop the enemy main attack.


How?

I actually have found that a reserve is not always best used to reinforce the MLR first echelon. Sometimes the terrain will make it much more favorable to use the reserves as a second defensive echelon to which your first echelons can fall back and continue the fight from there. In other words, I discovered that a reserve does not have to be brought to the main body, but rather the main body can be brought to the reserve!

This is only possible if the first echelon can successfully withdraw to better positions in the second echelon safely. 

One nice benefit of this unexpected maneuver in my experience is the enemy will continue to shell the now empty first echelon only to arrive in great force to empty positions. If I've killed 1/3 of his force by now or less, I've already turned the odds highly in my favor as well as caused him to exhaust resources, which are now unavailable for my second echelon.


This concludes the tactical portion of the article. Please read below of my overall conclusion, and browse the appendix for a wealth of information.




Debates, Differences, and What's Next?

That is the culmination (basically) of what I believe an effective defense consists of today. It's a theory that I think works well at the hands of a good commander. One needs practice, and experience, in order to have the judgement necessary to make these stages work well. I have by no means mastered my own doctrine. I also believe there is a far larger horizon ahead and I wouldn't be surprised if I found better ways of conducting defensive maneuver in the near future.

I've also been engaged in discussion with current and ex U.S Army officers on the doctrine I've laid out before you here, as well as a similarly Soviet-influenced doctrine on attacking I may write about in time. Particularly, I've found reluctance in many respectable individuals to use an SRE as I've described at this scale. 

One such reason is the US Army's ability to have technology (satellite, drones, etc.) conduct a recon in place of men on foot. The US Army recon is highly trained but few in numbers. They serve a very different role than what I've described above. The US prefer to use recon for the purpose of confirming information discovered by their technology as well as estimated by their commanders in what is called "Route Recon." That is, the commander formulates a plan (of attack for example) based on the "METT-T" analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time) using information supplied by technology. This plan is then assisted, but not decided by a small recon along the route of the plan. The recon helps the commander deal with expected obstacles along that route. To illustrate an example in CM, if you were attacking using this type of recon you may have a squad ahead of your main body along your advance, but you certainly wouldn't have small teams scattered on a broad front over a 1km wide avenue of attack. 
One benefit of this doctrine is the time saved. Provided the technology is there, usually the initial plan is a good one and the lack of broad front recon is less crucial to the situation. Without that however, (for example in world war two or in the event of denial by the enemy) it is my opinion that singularly route recon is a recipe for disaster.

This has been debated on the forum (though poorly) and is still being discussed over email. Regardless of my thoughts, it's an issue that should be looked at by all students interested in doctrine, and that is why I have referenced it here.

I've also left out many aspects of the defense here, including anti-air and air power. On the modern battlefield further we have to worry about nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. Finally, there are many situations that warrant a flexibility of doctrine. Doctrine is not a means to itself, but a means to win. A doctrine based on European terrain will have to be adapted to suit different conflicts in different areas.

The future of my learning will be focused on making the principles of doctrine innate to my thinking. This will help me identify means of adapting my means to any situation while keeping in context with what works. I'm reading articles on lessons the Soviets were taught harshly in Chechnya against Jihad. I'm thinking more about urban environments and how to adapt my doctrine to suit those conditions. Desert warfare, Mountain warfare, even war in space or on other planets (don't laugh) are possibilities I am working on in my head, trying to establish how the concepts (as opposed to the mechanics) of my doctrine would apply. I do not want to fall into a rigid mode of thinking as was seen in World War One.

The concepts, or principles of warfare, I don't believe will change much or have changed throughout history. What will change is how those principles can be applied.

I wrote this in part to make those devoted to the study feel encouraged to discuss with me. If you would be interested, my email is Adam_S_Lloyd@Yahoo.com. I also think a public discussion on the forum is a great way to allow others to follow along and learn themselves; this is how I learned in many instances. 

I enjoy helping players of all levels. (Just be nice) :)

Feel free to create a thread on this article.





Appendix

http://140.153.246.2/cache.htm TRADOC

http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/fmsopubs.htm Foreign Military Studies

http://call.army.mil/ Army Lessons Learned

http://www.irwin.army.mil/11acr/ Black Horse Cavalry (OPFOR)

http://shop.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/results.asp?WRD=Glantz%2C+David&userid=2IQI7U9LCA Books by David Glantz

http://call.army.mil/call/homepage/video.htm For those of you who don't like reading

http://147.238.100.101/dtdd/armormag/ Armor Magazine (Fresh Ideas)

http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/012511.html LOS Speaks! 

http://combathq.thegamers.net/ Miscellaneous for CM (Lots)