CPX Initial Strategic Overview
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Note: Some of below information is hypothetical.

A. Strategic Situation.
“We retreated too fast for them.” These were the words Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, newly appointed OB West, used to explain the September 1944 stabilization of the front line after the August disaster in France. The Allies' 30+ combat divisions each required hundreds of tons every day to maintain normal combat operations. The 450-mile supply lines from Cherbourg and the Normandy beach ports proved too long to support this demand. As a result, the broad Allied advance was forced to slow.

This pause afforded the decimated Wehrmacht divisions the time they needed to rebuild shattered battalions and put the pick into the ground and dig in. They did so quickly, along the entire front, from Holland to Switzerland. As a result of the Allies supply-driven inability to maintain contact, there would be no resolution before Christmas 1944. Too much hard fighting remained.

B. Front Lines, North to South, 25 September 1944.
Antwerp, the key Western European port, fell to Canadian forces on 4 September, but Germans still held key terrain on the Scheldt peninsula. Without the Scheldt cleared, no supply would move through Antwerp. The German 15. Armee, a tired formation composed of veteran infantrymen, was slowly retreating eastward. Field Marshall Montogomery’s 17 September airborne action against the bridges over the Maas, Waal, and Rhine rivers and the ground offensive to relieve those forces was nearing an indecisive end. Student’s 1. Fallschirmjaeger. Armee, a formation formed in the first week of September 1944, aided by the elite, but shattered II. SS-Pz. Korps, managed to stopped the British 21st Army short of the Rhine, thereby ending the flanking threat against the northern Ruhr.

American forces from the U.S. 1st Army under General Hodges had successfully threatened the first German city, Aachen, in early September. German panzer forces from the LVIII. Panzer. Korps launched several counterattacks with heavy tanks, but had been unable to regain complete control of the city. The strength of the attacks surprised Allied intelligence officers, who did not think the German Order of Battle still possessed the level of equipment that appeared on the battlefield outside of Aachen.

Further south, Patton’s Third Army was fighting against several German armies (the 1. Armee, 5. Panzer- Armee, and parts of the 19. Armee) and suffered the worst of the supply shortage. The entire Third was receiving only 6,000 tons per day, far short of the level required to effectively wage a modern military operation. Artillery ammunition was in particularly short supply. The forces stacked against the Americans tended to be of mixed quality.

C. Operational Situation, German Forces. 1. Armee, 5. Pz.-Armee.

Reference: HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION/FRONT LINE MAP
Click to enlarge

The brief halt in the US advance allowed Hitler to plan a counterattack into the right flank of the US 3rd Army in the area around Nancy. According to intelligence sources, a green Armored Division (identified as the 4 AD) had recently moved into the front line in an exposed position. A sharp strike against this salient and the entire 3rd Army could be forced back across the Moselle River line, out of Nancy, and hereby relieve pressure against the city of Metz.

Von Manteuffel's 5. Panzer-Armee was to conduct the major part of this offensive. The 5. Panzer. was composed of two veteran, but weakened Panzer Divisions (11 and 21) and two recently rebuilt formations, the 111.Pz.Brigade and the 113.Pz.Brigade. The 4 units fielded over 150 tanks combined, including approximately 60 Panthers. The 15.PzG.Div supported this armor force. The offensive was scheduled to start 25 September.

The 1. Armee was ordered to conduct holding attacks to prevent American reinforcement against the German armored attack. The main effort was to be applied by the 1. and 3. PzG.Div. The 1. PzG.Div would carry the major burden of protecting the right flank of the attack (see map). Its objectives were to reduce the recently forced bridgehead and secure crossing points to the Moselle River.

D. Operational Situation, American Forces. XII Corps/3rd Army.
The German counter-offensive was aimed at the American XII Corps which was holding recently won positions across the Moselle River.

The Moselle River proved a tough line to crack, including hard combat by the 80th ID around the town of Dielouard. As a result of these actions, the 80th was at less than 70% strength, but it had won a crossing over the Moselle and forced the Germans to retreat out of Nancy and Luneville. The American commander committed his reserve infantry division, the 1st ID to the action, and it was able to advance to within 5 kilometers of the Seille River nearly unopposed with these fresh soldiers.

On the foggy morning of 25 September, German panzers attacked the exposed positions of the 4 Armored Divisions, destroying nearly 25 Sherman tanks in close fighting. The rest of the Division broke contact and withdrew 10 kilometers to the west. That afternoon, three more major German advances hit the American lines. Two of these were stopped by massed artillery fire, but the third fell on a lightly held portion of the front. Germans tanks broke out, driving west and over-ran a Regimental Combat Team HQ as the sun set.

That night (25 SEPT 44), the American Corps commander issued two major orders:

1. 6 Armor Division. Reinforce 4.AD to restore front line.
2. 1 Infantry Division. Attack towards Sillegny to threaten right flank of German advance.

E. German 1.PzG. Div. Situation.

Reference: FRONT LINES - TACTICAL MAP
Click to enlarge

The German 1.PzG. Div had recently been rebuilt and arrived at the front on 15 September just as the 553.VolksG.Div was about to collapse under pressure from the US XII Corps. The panzer-grenadiers were able to stabilize the front in fairly heavy woods about 8 kilometers west of the important town of Sillegny. The fresh formation fielded over 30 deadly 88mm Flaks and 50 armored vehicles. The American commander, sensing he had run into a serious threat, pulled his troops into a defensive position east of the hills dominating the Moselle river.

The 1.PzG.Div fielded 2 PzG Regiments, a Pz Battalion, an artillery regiment and various recon, engineer and antitank assets. The unit was composed of a mix of veteran soldiers from the eastern front (units destoryed in the summer Soviet offensive against Armeegruppe Center) and new recruits. The German logistical situation had greatly improved since Normandy.

As the right flank of the German offensive, the 1.PzG.Div was tasked with reducing the Allied bridge head around the town of Arry and securing crossings over the Moselle River. The 1.PzG.Div was planned to attack on the morning of 26 September with the objective of accomplishing its mission by night fall, 27 September.

F. US 1 Infantry Div. Situation.
The Americans opposing the 1.PzG.Div were from the 1st Infantry Division. The 1st had been in Corps reserve as the 80 ID and 4 AD fought to secure crossings over the Moselle. On 14 September it was committed to continue the advance, but was slowed by increasing German resistance. Supply shortages begin to effect combat operations, particularly in artillery ammunition. Given American doctrinal stress on artillery, this shortage greatly reduced battlefield firepower.

Corps moved up 2 additional medium artillery battalions to help support the 1st Infantry's bridgehead. The 1st ID was built around the traditional American "triangle" organization - 3 Battalions in each of 3 Regiments. Additional tank and tank destroyer assets were attached.

On the night of 25 September, the American Corps commander, reeling from that day's German attack in the 4 AD's sector, ordered the 1st ID to attack towards Sillegny at first light. He wanted to aggressively threaten the German right flank.

As the morning of the 26 September broke these two fresh opponents were about to run straight into each other in a classic "meeting engagement." This is the context for the first CMMC Command Post Exercise (CPX)!